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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN INDONESIA

by

Sandra L. Nagy

December 1996

Thesis Advisor:

Claude A. Buss

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Islamic Fundamentalism In Indonesia

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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
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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, confrontation between Muslim and non-Muslim cultures has become more likely, mostly due to the West's fear of rising Islamic fundamentalism. Indonesia's 185 million Muslims constitute the world's largest Islamic population in a single country. Despite evidence of Islamic activism, thus far, Indonesia has insulated its political process from these forces.

The extent to which Indonesia is a Muslim country is difficult to measure. Domestic policies prohibit political expression of Islam, forcing tolerance and social harmony among all religions. This lack of outward Islamic appearances is misleading. Events in Indonesia the last twenty years show a trend of rising Islamic fundamentalism.

This is a study of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. It examines the past, present and future role of Islam in Indonesian politics and society. This thesis defines Islamic fundamentalism as the return to the foundations and principles of Islam including all movements based on the desire to create a more Islamic society. It examines the three aspects of Islamic fundamentalism: revivalism, resurgence, and radicalism. It analyzes Islam's role in Indonesia under Dutch colonial rule, an alien Christian imperialist power, and after independence in 1945.

Underneath appearances of calm inactivity, Islamic fundamentalism thrives in Indonesia, influencing all levels of society. The government advocates Islam as a social force, suppressing political Islam. No viable

Islamic political parties exist nor are they allowed to form today in Indonesia. Unable to promote fundamentalist or political religious dogma, Muslim intellectuals package their ideas under social and educational welfare activities. The absence of a strong Muslim political party could prove dangerous to future political stability. There exists no political mechanism for Muslims to express their views or exercise activism. Radical fundamentalism emerges in its worst form in the absence of institutional means of expressing dissent.

The tradition of Muslim extremism exists in Indonesia. While it is difficult to gauge their collective force, the potential of radical fundamentalists to destabilize the country is readily apparent. Sporadic violent outbreaks have occurred in the past, threatening national stability. Even today, some military officers are not convinced that Islamic radicalism has been extinguished.

Currently, Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia has little effect on the cooperative pursuit of peace, stability, and prosperity in the East Asia-Pacific region. This thesis examines the ways in which Islamic fundamentalism could potentially threaten U.S. security interests. It concludes that growing Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia is inevitable but not likely to pose a direct threat to U.S. interests in the near future. Nonetheless, it deserves close attention given Islam's propensity to mobilize mass support throughout the country.

I. INTRODUCTION

"If someone is able to separate sugar from its sweetness,
he will be able to separate Islam from politics."

- K.H.A. Wahab Chasbullah¹

On September 12, 1984, Muslim riots occurred in the Indonesian province of Tanjung Priok, causing numerous casualties. During that year, Islamic activity increased in northern Jakarta. Islamic teachers emphasized themes such as morality, the importance of following the Shari'a, and the duty to fight unbelievers. In early September, Army officers entered a prayer house in the Tanjung Priok district looking for illegal leaflets, reportedly threatening to apprehend people. Several alleged Muslim extremists were arrested, inspiring sermons calling for the detainees freedom. This culminated in a demonstration at the local police and military subcommand headquarters with the crowd chanting "Allah is great." Government forces fired shots, killing 63 persons and wounding another hundred people. Some Muslims accused Christian Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) Commander General Murdani of instigating events in the interests of the Christians out to destroy the Islamic community.²

¹Quoted in Adam Schwarz, A Nation In Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), p. 162.

²Fred R von der Mehden, "Malaysia and Indonesia," in Shireen T. Hunter, ed., The Politics of Islamic Revivalism (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1988), p. 250.

Different stories tell what happened on that day.³ The religious aspects were downplayed despite the government and ABRI's inherent fear of extreme "Islamic fundamentalism". Throughout history, the role of Islam has caused conflict and tension between the Indonesian government and its predominantly Muslim population. Tanjung Priok was not an isolated incident, rather it was the culmination of a chain of events indicating the growing dangers of fundamentalism. The question on everyone's lips was: will Islamic fundamentalism ultimately destabilize Indonesia as it has rocked the Muslim world from Arabia to Pakistan and Iran?

This is a study of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. It examines the past, present and future role of Islam in Indonesian society. This study accepts Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser's general argument:

The role of Islam is likely to grow in the internal politics of Muslim countries. Only by exposure to and inclusion in the political process will Islamic politics eventually lose its current attraction and become more normal. Because the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism is being mishandled by a number of important Muslim states, the chances of it coming to power in one or more [Middle Eastern] countries are good.⁴

Thesis research was conducted from July 1994 through March

³Government sources reported an armed, angry mob of 1500 rioting and a lower number of people killed. See Susumu Awanohara, "A First Warning Shot," Far Eastern Economics Review (September 27, 1984): 14.

⁴Islamic fundamentalism is used in place of the catch phrase "political Islam." Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995), p. 4.

1995. Most data are based on books, dissertations, monologues and periodicals. During the course of research, two weeks were spent in Indonesia collecting information. Fifteen interviews were conducted while in country with prominent government officials, intellectuals, Islamic scholars, and a "converted" Muslim extremist who was imprisoned from 1984 to 1993.

Webster's dictionary defines fundamentalism as a movement or attitude similar to the early twentieth century militantly conservative movements in American Protestantism which opposed modernist tendencies and emphasized the inerrancy of the scripture (Bible) as fundamental to Christianity. Similarly, Bruce Lawrence defines fundamentalism as:

the affirmation of religious authority as holistic and absolute, admitting of neither criticism nor reduction and expressed through the collective demand that specific creedal and ethical dictates derived from scripture be publicly recognized and legally enforced.⁵

In general, religious fundamentalists separate themselves from surrounding modern society, prefer their theocratic system over the acting political government, emphasize the literal validity of their scripture, and criticize institutionalized religion. They sometimes reject science and modernization but do not hesitate to use technology to further their cause.⁶

⁵Bruce Lawrence, Defenders of God (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), p. 27.

⁶For example, Ayatollah Khomeini became popular among the Iranian masses by distributing tapes (with Islamic scripture quotations) to encourage revolt against the Shah.

Muslims, particularly scholars, object to the currently fashionable use of the term "fundamentalism" in reference to Islam.⁷ Only Christians proudly identify themselves as fundamentalists. Islamic and Jewish fundamentalisms were invented by outside observers, in reference to behavior reflective of the twentieth century Protestant religious movement.⁸ Regardless, Islamic fundamentalism has become the descriptive label for movements advocating a more Islamic society. It represents their desire to return to the religious principles on which Islam was founded. As such, Islamic fundamentalism is present in every country where Islam is practiced.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, confrontation between Muslim and non-Muslim cultures has become more likely, mostly due to the West's fear of rising Islamic fundamentalism. The phenomenon labeled "Islamic fundamentalism" is a Western derived concept that incorrectly equates Islam with threat. Selective media coverage contributes to this distorted view of Islam by providing images of bombings, hijackings, hostage-taking, and

⁷ Fundamentalism is considered an improper, Western-derived term for concepts both alien and hostile to the Islamic religious ethos. See Riffat Hassan, "The Burgeoning of Islamic Fundamentalism," in Norman J. Cohen, ed., The Fundamentalist Phenomenon (Detroit: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990) pp. 152-4, 160-3. Justification for usage of the term "fundamentalism" can be found in Martin E. Marty, ed., Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. iv-viii.

⁸Labeling some Muslims and Jews as fundamentalist in nature runs the risk of "damning the target group". Lawrence, Defenders of God, 91.

revolution initiated by radical fundamentalists. The "f" and "t" words, "fundamentalism" and "terrorism," are linked in the minds of many.⁹ As a result, the return to the foundational beliefs of Islam, commonly termed "resurgence" or "revivalism", is predominately viewed as a threat to Western interests.

This study employs the definition of Islamic fundamentalism as the return to the foundations and principles of Islam. In this context, Islamic fundamentalism includes all movements based on the desire to create a more Islamic society. Therefore, this study rejects the Indonesian preference to use the catch phrase "political Islam" and the currently fashionable term "Islamism"¹⁰ in place of Islamic fundamentalism.

For purposes of this thesis, "Muslim" describes all who believe in and practice Islam or consider themselves to be Muslim. When used as an adjective referring to a state or country, "Muslim" connotes that the majority population in the nation practices Islam. "Muslim" is largely interchangeable with the word "Islamic" except when referring to the state. An Islamic state is a country that officially incorporates Islamic law as the legal basis of the nation.

Chapter II focuses on universal Islamic fundamentalism. It

⁹John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 173. See discussion on emotionally loaded terms in Hassan, "The Burgeoning of Islamic Fundamentalism," 157.

¹⁰Islamism is the modern phenomenon consisting of political movements carrying an agenda that goes beyond mere religious goals to seek the reform of state and society. Fuller and Lesser, A Sense of Siege, 6. See also Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 35-46.

discusses Islamic religious beliefs in order to provide background for the evolution of Islamic reform and fundamentalist theology. It also addresses Islamic fundamentalism as a phenomenon evident in three aspects: revivalism, resurgence and radicalism. Finally, it analyzes the universal aims and methods of propagation of groups involved in Islamic movements primarily as evidenced in the case studies of fundamentalism in Iran, Algeria and Pakistan.

Chapter III specifically addresses the historical role of Islam in Indonesia. It discusses the advent of Islam, showing the adaptation difficulties encountered by Indonesians before they gained sovereignty as a nation. This chapter underscores the problems of colonials of Islamic faith when ruled by an alien Christian imperialist nation. It then analyzes the place assigned to Islam in the formative years of Indonesia's nationhood, describing the various movements that asserted themselves up to 1995.

Although Indonesia holds the world's largest Muslim population, Islam was less influential as a national ideology than Pancasila. Pancasila was first introduced upon independence in 1945 as the five philosophical principles of nationalism, democracy, humanitarianism, social welfare, and belief in one god. Sukarno articulated these principles to unify the major cleavages in Indonesian society. It remains a unifying moral framework for Indonesia's diverse population.

Pancasila forced the Muslim majority to compromise and

accept the fact that Islam is not central to Indonesia's political system. Regardless, those people advocating political Islam have undertaken different strategies to promote Islamic fundamentalism and the creation of a more Islamic society in Indonesia.¹¹ Other fundamentalists have been forced underground.¹²

Chapter IV outlines the current situation. It examines the policies the Soeharto government has pursued to maintain stability in spite of the challenging power of Islam. It weighs the evidence on the future course of fundamentalism and makes judgements on the likelihood of the government's continuing ability to keep it under control.

Chapter V is a discussion of the special concerns of the United States regarding the fundamentalist factor in U.S.-Indonesian relations. It proceeds from the February 1995 statement of A National Security Strategy of Engagement And Enlargement issued by the White House and United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region issued by the Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs in February 1995. It recognizes that security, commerce, and the

¹¹Because no official statements can be made advocating negara Islam, remaining supporters use different strategies. Methods to aspire for the formation of an Islamic state are likely available through the channels of education, legislation and the mosques. Interview with Ms. Clara Yoewono, Assistant Director for Public Affairs, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, January 20, 1995.

¹²Small extremist groups emerge periodically and several Muslim radicals remain scattered throughout Indonesia.

promotion of democracy and human rights are the basic U.S. interests in Indonesia as in the rest of the world. Its entire effort is to make a correct assessment of Islamic fundamentalism to determine U.S. policy toward Indonesia, the largest and strongest power in Southeast Asia.

This thesis concludes that growing Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia is inevitable but will not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests in the near future. The lack of outward Islamic appearances is misleading. Underneath the appearance of calm inactivity, Islamic fundamentalism thrives in Indonesia, however, currently it has little affect on the cooperative pursuit of peace, stability, and prosperity in the East Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, Islamic fundamentalism deserves close attention given Islam's propensity to mobilize mass support throughout Indonesia.

II. UNIVERSAL ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

"Our religion is our politics,
our politics is our religion."

-Mian Tufayl Muhammad¹³

Today Islam is the second-most practiced religion, observed by approximately one-fifth of the world's total population. In 1990, over one billion Muslims inhabited areas covering several million square miles from China and the Pacific rim to the Atlantic, as well as portions of Europe and more recently North America. Islam and the Muslim culture exceed geographic boundaries. Muslims live in every possible climate and terrain, and are represented in almost every race.¹⁴

Muslims believe Islam teaches man to follow the straight path toward a better afterlife. Societal reform is an integral part of Islamic teachings, inspiring three types of Islamic fundamentalist movements. Effective national security policy toward Islamic fundamentalism is difficult to derive without a general understanding of Islam. Many U.S. policy makers lack an understanding of the basic religious precepts of Islam and historic Muslim cultural values. Islam, like any other religion, provides people with spiritual guidance. However, compared with other religions, Islam spells out the way of life through

¹³Quoted in Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: Jama'at-i Islam of Pakistan (California: University of California Berkeley, 1994), p. viii.

¹⁴Shaykh F. Haeri, The Elements of Islam (Cambridge: Zahra Publications, 1993), p. 121.

explicit injunctions. This chapter covers Islamic religious convictions and duties, fundamentalist theology and movements, and case studies to clarify misunderstandings about Islam and provide background information for an assessment of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia.

A. TRADITIONAL ISLAM

Muslims follow beliefs and practices which are similar in nature to those found in other religions. The prophet Mohammad, who lived from 570 to 632 (A.D.) on the Christian calendar, revealed the Islamic faith to mankind. The concept of "din," commonly translated from Arabic as "religion", is central to Islamic philosophy. The root of the word din relates to obedience and following or one who is indebted.¹⁵ The word "Islam" means obedience and submission to the will of God in the Arabic language. Islamic traditions can be compared to those of any other religion with ceremonial and social rituals. Islam generally consists of three religious elements: beliefs, obligations, and practices.

Following Mohammad's death, Islam lacked both structure and a central figurehead to act as the religious authority. Four sources of Islamic religious authority later evolved: the Qur'an, the Hadith, the Ijma, and Shari'a. The Qur'an is the recorded

¹⁵Esposito defines "din" simply as "religion" in the glossary of Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) while Haeri contends that "religion" does not capture the full significance of the term "din" which portrays a form of life-transaction between God and man. For further discussion see Haeri, The Elements of Islam, pp. 23, 157; and T.B. Irving, The World of Islam (Vermont: Amana Books Inc, 1984), p. 132.

divine statement that was delivered directly to the Prophet Mohammad. Muslims regard the Qur'an as the "Book of Knowledge," similar to the Christian view of the Bible. Mohammad's behavior and conduct, the Sunna, represent the ideal standard for Muslims to follow.¹⁶ The Hadith, also known as the Traditions, is a scholarly account of the Sunna.¹⁷

A third source of authority is ijma which means general consensus. Ijma developed after Mohammad's death to replace the loss of his direct guidance in legislative matters. However, two kinds of consensus emerged. The consensus of the entire community was applied to the religious duties practiced by all Muslims. In most other cases, consensus became restricted to the community of Islamic scholars and clergy known as the ulama.¹⁸

Throughout history, Islamic law remained central to Muslim identity and practice, providing legal and moral guidance. Thus, a fourth source of Islamic authority is the Shari'a. Muslims believe the Shari'a is God's universal law and a system of ethics which directs what a Muslim ought or ought not do. Legal rights and duties are divided into two major categories: duties to God such as Islamic rituals of worship, and social duties according

¹⁶Haeri, The Elements Of Islam, 18.

¹⁷By the ninth century, the number of Traditions increased to over thousands. As a result, Islamic scholars traveled throughout the Muslim world collecting Traditions and gathering information on their narrators to authenticate the Hadith. Six collections are considered valid: those of Ismail al-Bukhari, Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Abu Dawud al-Nisai, al-Tirmidhi, and Ibn Maja. Esposito, Islam, 81.

¹⁸The ulama act on behalf of and guide the Muslim communities.

to penal, commercial and family law.

The fundamentals of Islam include the following beliefs and forms of ritualistic worship practiced universally among Muslims.¹⁹ Belief in the Islamic creed, the shahadah, is foremost. It is the testimony that there is no god but Allah (the One God) and Mohammad is his messenger. A second Muslim belief is in divine justice which ultimately prevails in the form of reward or punishment either on earth or in heaven. Divine justice relates to the Muslim belief in an afterlife following the death of the body. The concepts of prophethood²⁰ and spiritual leadership comprise the two remaining fundamental beliefs. Muslims believe that every society needs to follow a leader who has exhibited virtuous qualities like the prophet Mohammad.

The "Five Pillars" of Islam require Muslims to practice the creed, prayer, fasting, alms and charity, and pilgrimage. Muslims profess their faith by reciting the shahadah. This creedal acknowledgement of and commitment to God reaffirms the monotheism of Islam and Muslim devotion to din through oral

¹⁹Cited Islamic beliefs and practices compound a comprehensive representation of discussions in Esposito, chap. 3; Caesar E. Farah, Islam (New York: Barron's Educational Series Inc, 1968), chap. 6, 7; Haeri, The Elements of Islam, chap. 3; Irving, The World of Islam, chap. 15; and Mahmud Shaltout, "Islamic Beliefs and Code of Laws," in Islam - The Straight Path, Kenneth Morgan, ed., (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958), chap 3.

²⁰The word prophet is applied more inclusively in Islam than in the Judaeo-Christian religions. It is applied to Abraham, Noah, Joseph and John the Baptist as well as nonbiblical prophets of Arabia like Hud and Salih. Esposito, Islam, 22.

testimony. A second ritual is the salat which means public prayer. Ablutions proceed each prayer to ensure cleanliness and purity before approaching God. The salat²¹ occurs five times daily at dawn, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset and evening.

Muslims in good health engage in sawm, or fasting, during the ninth month of the year, known as Ramadan.²² This ritual requires restraint from eating, drinking, smoking and sexual intercourse from sunrise to sunset. A three day celebration known as Id al-Fitr breaks the fast, marking the end of Ramadan.²³ Similar to the Christian Christmas holiday, many Muslim countries declare a national holiday and family members gather from near and abroad to celebrate by feasting and exchanging gifts.

Additionally Muslims practice the zakat, or almsgiving. Originally a tax levied on a certain quantity of items, the zakat developed into voluntary charity. Practicing Muslims generally pay around two and a half percent of their income in zakat. The final Pillar is the hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, during the

²¹Performing salat is a ritual in itself requiring various actions and movement. Detailed descriptions provided in Haeri, The Elements of Islam, 38-39; and William Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Chicago: Edinburgh University Press, 1962), pp. 195-6.

²²Muslims follow a lunar calendar such that Ramadan does not coincide with our month of September. Ramadan fell on February of this year (1995).

²³Esposito, Islam, 90-92.

twelfth month of the year.²⁴ The devout Muslim makes the pilgrimage at least once in his lifetime as Mohammad did, joining thousands others worshipping in Mecca. The hajj links the Islamic masses from various countries together, creating a powerful feeling of solidarity among Muslims.

Jihad, struggle in the way of good, is sometimes referred to as a sixth pillar. The Greater Jihad represents human self-purification and an inner struggle over evils such as lust and greed. The Lower Jihad relates to struggle in the outer world, culminating in the Muslim's willingness to put his or her life in danger when the circumstances demand it.²⁵ It is this act of fighting a war in the name of Allah (Lower Jihad) that the West considers synonymous with the word jihad. Despite the fact that jihad is not supposed to include aggressive warfare, Muslim extremists and radical groups like Afghanistan's Mujaheddin and Egypt's Jihad Organization²⁶ employ the term as a declaration of war.²⁷

²⁴Muslims perform several symbolic acts while in the sacred area of Mecca. For specifics on hajj rituals and their religious significance see Haeri, The Elements of Islam, 40-42.

²⁵Ibid, 43.

²⁶Members of the Jihad Organization assassinated Egypt's President Anwar Sadat.

²⁷Esposito, Islam, 94.

B. ISLAMIC REFORM

From early on, Islam encouraged reform. Muslims quickly responded to any compromising of Islamic faith and practice. Examples include the Shi'i split from the majority Sunni sect, the emergence of Sufism, the development of the Shari'a, the origin of fundamentalist theology, and the Wahhabi reactionary movement.

Shi'i refers to the followers of Ali ibn Abi Talib who represent a minority faction of all Muslims.²⁸ The Shi'is believe Mohammad designated Ali as his heir and successor at Ghadir Khum upon his return from Mecca in 632. The Sunnis acknowledge an event occurred at Ghadir Khum; however, they believe Mohammad made a statement awarding Ali merit rather than a political appointment.²⁹ The basic difference (in interpretation) over who was entitled to succession caused Muslims to divide into two sects. Shi'is and Sunnis developed two different Islamic theologies and histories. After splitting from the Sunnis, the Shi'i Muslims centered their history on the martyred family of Mohammad, believing that the leadership of the Islamic community belonged to his descendants beginning with Ali. The fundamental difference between the two sects lies in the Shi'i doctrine of the imamate. The imam acts as a political and

²⁸The Shi'i do not constitute more than ten percent of the total Muslim population; the other 90 percent being Sunnis. Rafiq Zakaria, The Struggle Within Islam (London: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 143.

²⁹Haeri, The Elements of Islam, 59.

religious guide, leading the community through divine inspiration.³⁰ Sunnis uphold the caliphate in which a successor of Mohammad is elected to lead the Islamic community.³¹

Likewise, the espousal of Sufism represented a sort of protest. Its doctrine hoped to reform social and political abuses by appealing to the religious consciousness of Muslims through asceticism and mysticism. Sufi devotional customs evolved by the 8th century,³² emphasizing a lifestyle of detachment from the material world to avoid distraction from God. Although never fully accepted by Muslim orthodoxy³³, Sufism benefited Islam by enabling it to spread. The regions where Hinduism and Buddhism were already established (from India to Southeast Asia) proved fertile ground for the acceptance of Sufism.³⁴ As a result, Islam flourished in Asia, well beyond its origin in the Middle East.

The development of the Shari'a exemplifies Islamic reform

³⁰Shi'is believe imams must be direct descendants of Mohammad and Ali.

³¹Esposito, Islam, 45-6.

³²Meditative and ritualistic practices characterize Sufism. In the course of time, it became a religion within a religion with an exclusive structure of ideas and obligations. For more detailed discussion of Sufi doctrine and practice see Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979), chap. 8.

³³Several Sufi views depart from the orthodox norm of Islamic doctrine. See Farah, Islam, chap. 10, and Dilip Hiro, Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism (New York: Routledge, 1989), chap. 2.

³⁴Haeri, The Elements of Islam, 69. For negative reactions to Sufism see Esposito, Islam, 102-3.

which addressed the need for a Muslim legal system. Legal development in Islam was predetermined either by God's revelations to Mohammad or customary law of the Arab tribes. Mohammad treated cases on individual merits, addressing legal issues virtually without uniformity or a code. Upon the Prophet's death, Muslims followed practical precedents derived from Qur'anic guidelines and the recorded legal decisions of cases made by Mohammad. The Shari'a evolved, encompassing legislation from the Qur'an and Hadith to provide uniform legal principles for Islamic society.

Scholars note that Islamic fundamentalism preceded the 1978-79 Iranian revolution but was not widely recognized as a distinct phenomenon.³⁵ Fundamentalist theology emerged from different interpretations of the Qur'an and was originally represented by the Sunni Hanbalites.³⁶ Islamic groups and movements became labeled "fundamentalist" after the Iranian revolution by association with and comparison to Iran. Without the revolution, Muslim activists would be described as dissident radicals.³⁷

³⁵Lawrence, Defenders of God, 190. See also Thomas W. Lippman, Politics and Religion in the Muslim World (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1982), introduction; and Lawrence Kaplan, Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), pp. iii-vi.

³⁶The followers of Ahmad ibn-Hanbal established a separate school of thought, strongly followed in Iraq and Syria in the early 16th century. Hanbalites generally advocated intolerant and fanatical views regarding literal adherence to Qur'anic scripture and strict religious obligations as defined by the Shari'a. Farah, Islam, 193-4.

³⁷Lawrence, Defenders of God, 232.

Prior to 1970, Muslim activists articulated radical concepts characteristic more of an intellectual current than a political movement. Indian Muslim writers introduced theories claiming that Islam no longer existed amidst the secularist and nationalist society which emerged in India during the 1930s and 1940s. This concept was considered radical because the authors argued that Islam needed to be recreated. Despite such early proclamations, intellectual radicalism did not form a comprehensive and activist doctrine until the mid-1950s, in Egypt. At this time, Sayyid Qutb articulated an authoritative radical ideology which remained confined to Egypt and Syria for two decades. Simultaneously, Mohammad Baquir Al-Sadr created his own brand of radicalism in Iraq. Thus, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq provided the breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism, formerly called intellectual radicalism.³⁸

The first Islamic fundamentalist movement traces back to the eighteenth century. Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab founded and gave his name to the movement, seeking a return to Islamic orthodoxy, the purification of Islam from innovations, and ending corrupt religious practices throughout Arabia.³⁹ Greatly influenced by Imam Hanbal (leader of the Sunni Hanbalites), al-Wahhab emphasized the inerrancy of the Qur'an, Hadith and Shari'a.⁴⁰

³⁸For detailed discussion on the development of radical Islamic ideology see Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), p. 70.

³⁹See Rahman, Islam, 196-201.

⁴⁰Zakaria, Struggle Within Islam, 174-5.

His followers helped Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman al-Saud successfully conquer the Arabian peninsula by 1927. In effect, al-Saud used Islamic fundamentalism, derived from al-Wahhab's teachings, to legitimize the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

C. THE NATURE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Faith is central to the comprehensive reform of contemporary Muslim society. As such, fundamentalism explicitly demands a return to true Islam, the Islam of Mohammad and his early successors.⁴¹ Essentially, Islamic fundamentalism seeks reform through fighting. Fundamentalists are followers of traditional Islam who feel threatened. They react by fighting to reform society and reasserting their core religious identity. In doing so, the fight for a return to traditional Islam or orthodoxy materializes. Some fundamentalists remain passive while others fight for a changed civil polity or separatism. Islamic fundamentalists initiate a fight of some sort, protesting either generalized or specific enemies, such as the West or current ruling regime. Further, the fundamentalist fight for reform is waged in the name of Allah (God).⁴²

⁴¹A modern state cannot function on the basis of medieval ideas. The Islamic community needs the services and convenience of modern technology in the framework of a modern state. Therefore the fundamentalist demand to reestablish the early Islamic community should not be viewed in a literal sense, rather as an attempt to reapply the Qur'an and Sunna rigorously to existing times. John Obert Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 240. Also see Esposito, Islam, 117.

⁴²Marty and Appleby, eds. Fundamentalisms Observed, iv-viii.

John L. Esposito, noted scholar of Islam, summarizes the elements present in Islamic fundamentalism in an ideological framework consisting of these beliefs:

1. Islam is a total and comprehensive way of life. Religion is integral to politics, law and society.
2. The failure of Muslim societies is due to their departure from the straight path of Islam and their following a Western secular path, with its materialistic ideologies and values.
3. The renewal of society requires a return to Islam, an Islamic religiopolitical and social reformation or revolution, drawing its inspiration from the Qur'an and from the first great Islamic movement led by the Prophet Mohammad.
4. To restore God's rule and inaugurate a true Islamic social order, Western-inspired civil codes must be replaced by Islamic law, which is the only acceptable blueprint for Muslim society.
5. Although the Westernization of society is condemned, modernization as such is not. Science and technology are accepted but they are to be subordinated to Islamic beliefs and values in order to guard against the Westernization and secularization of Muslim society.
6. The process of Islamization, or more accurately, re-Islamization, requires organizations or associations of dedicated and trained Muslims who by their example and activities call on others to be more observant and who are willing to struggle against corruption and social injustice.⁴³

Encompassing those characteristics, Islamic fundamentalism emerges as a phenomenon that seeks reform - be it social, religious or political. Reformists fall into different categories of fundamentalism, advocating the common goal of returning to the foundational beliefs of traditional Islam. The

⁴³Esposito, Islam, 163.

three types of Islamic fundamentalism are revivalism, resurgence and radicalism.

Groups and movements of the three types exhibit overlapping characteristics of fundamentalist theology, and differ primarily in the method of propagation by which their aims are achieved. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and some radical groups within Asia and Africa are concerned with seizing political power in their respective countries and establishing an Islamic state.⁴⁴

"Revivalism" reflects the type of Islamic fundamentalism characterized by political passivity, advocating a spiritual renewal of Islam. Also referred to as a renewalist tradition, Islamic revivalism encompasses three recurring themes: 1) the call for a return to, or a strict application of the Qur'an and the Sunna; 2) the assertion of independent analysis (ijtihad) of the Qur'an and Sunna in this application; and 3) the reaffirmation of the authenticity and uniqueness of the Qur'anic experience, in contrast to other Islamic sources of authority.⁴⁵ Revivalism also represents a reaffirmation of Islamic identity for those who feel threatened by the impact of the West and consequent internal changes within Muslim society.

⁴⁴Anthony Hyman, Muslim Fundamentalism (UK: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1985), p. 4.

⁴⁵John O. Voll, "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History," in John L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), chap. 2.

"Resurgence" takes fundamentalist⁴⁶ reform a step further by attempting to reassert Islam against competing ideologies and social forces which threaten the moral integrity or physical existence of the Muslim community. It emphasizes Islam as a socio-political movement establishing Islamic order, not just a collection of beliefs and rituals.⁴⁷ Islamic resurgence reflects increased emphasis on Muslim obligations (the Five Pillars of Islam), the proliferation of religious literature, music, television and radio programming, growth of Islamic associations, and reassertion of Islam in politics.⁴⁸ However, Islam becomes defined as much in terms of a political ideology as in terms of a religion.

"Radicalism," or Muslim extremism, advocates a change in the governmental system by creating its own order. It espouses militancy and heightened political consciousness opposed to the state (or ruling regime) and its governmental institutions. Islamic radicals fortify their identity by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from Islam's sacred past.

⁴⁶The terms fundamentalist, revivalist, and Islamist are often used interchangeably in Muslim scholarly literature, although fundamentalism has assumed a new connotation in the West, meaning radicalism. See discussion on the varieties and vocabulary of Islamic Revivalism in R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences," in Shireen T. Hunter, ed., The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1988), pp. 4-6.

⁴⁷Khurshid Ahmad, "The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence," in Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam, 222-3.

⁴⁸John L. Esposito, "Islamic Fundamentalism," House Foreign Affairs Committee Testimony (June 24, 1985): 1-15.

The retrieved fundamentals become modified, acquiring a new expression beyond the confines and practices of religion. Extremism generally represents the last attempt to establish a totalitarian Islamic state.⁴⁹ The ideological framework employed by radical fundamentalists contrasts that of revivalism or resurgence. Extremists share these beliefs:

1. The West (particularly the United States) is pit against the Islamic world.
2. Establishment of an Islamic system of government is not simply an alternative but an imperative, based on God's command or will. Therefore all Muslims must obey and follow the Shari'a (God's law).
3. Since the legitimacy of Muslim governments is based on the Shari'a, governments that do not follow it are illegitimate. Those who fail to follow Islamic law, governments and individuals, are guilty of unbelief. They are no longer Muslims but atheists whose unbelief demands holy war.
4. Opposition to illegitimate governments extends to the official ulama, the religious establishment, and state-supported mosques and preachers who are considered to have been co-opted by the government.
5. Jihad against unbelief and unbelievers is a religious duty. All true believers are obliged to combat such governments and their supporters whether individuals or foreign governments. One is either a true believer or an infidel, saved or damned, a friend or enemy of God. The army of God is locked in holy war with followers of Satan.
6. Christians and Jews are unbelievers rather than "People of the Book" because their connections to Western Christian colonialism and Zionism. A Judaeo-Christian conspiracy exists against Islam and the Muslim world. Thus, non-Muslim minorities are often subjected to persecution.⁵⁰

⁴⁹Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, 12.

⁵⁰Esposito, Islam, 164.

Radicalism diverges from the precepts of Islam, encouraging violence and revolution to enforce these listed assumptions. Extremists believe that the refusal of Muslim governments to implement Islamic law is repressive, necessitating the counter use of violence and armed struggle. Jihad takes on the connotation of holy war in contrast to the nonviolent interpretations emphasized by mainstream Islamic leaders.

D. METHODS OF PROPAGATION

Islam is non-threatening in nature. Islamic radicalism, an extreme divergence from the return to the foundational beliefs of Islam, poses the ultimate threat to both Western interests and the political stability of the host country. Radicals resort to using violence or terrorism for achieving political ends. However, it is important to note that the Muslim fundamentalists who work within their governmental order outnumber the radicals who periodically emerge.

Outward manifestations of a return to Islamic fundamentals are found in all Muslim countries. Collective and individual Islamic behavior are seen in daily life. The attributes of social or spiritual activism include regular mosque attendance, stricter adherence to the Five Pillars, upholding a moral lifestyle, reading the Qur'an, participation in group activities organized by religious societies within and outside the mosque, community work, volunteer work for the less fortunate, and

wearing distinctive clothing.⁵¹ These actions passively reflect the Islamic revival or resurgence of fundamentalist Muslims who do not routinely manifest political activism.

In general, the fundamentalists involved in politics are more activist in nature. They exhibit the same behavior and attributes of spiritual activism except with greater rigor and passion. Public (verbal) expression of Islamic values reflects political activism. Islamic resurgence uses political activism to motivate efforts such as mosque building, Islamic radio and television programming, governmental recognition and celebrations of religious holidays, and distribution of religious literature. Often the politically active fundamentalists attend mosques that cater to their peculiar outlook. Some even attend private mosques which are funded by the worshippers, in contrast to those funded (supported and controlled) by the authorities.⁵²

Radical fundamentalism often degenerates into violent terrorism with no countervailing forces ready to check it. Extremists regard themselves as the only defenders of Islam, justifying their acts of terrorism and violence. Political terrorism occurs when a group, within or outside government, pursues radical ideological objectives using methods which ignore domestic and international law. Success relies primarily upon

⁵¹R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 54.

⁵²Ibid, 55.

the threat or use of violence.⁵³

Radicalism and terrorism determine, to an unduly large extent, the image of Islam. Unfortunately, sensational media coverage aids radical fundamentalists in achieving their aims by allowing Western fear (of Islam) to cater to their demands.⁵⁴ The purpose of terrorism, whether national or international, is to murder political enemies, deter potential foes, and destabilize society.⁵⁵ It frequently appears in times of political, social or economic crisis. The model for the spread of terrorism since the 1960s, both within the Middle East and abroad,⁵⁶ has been the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The doctrine and practices of the PLO diverge from Islam.⁵⁷ Its ultimate aim, the establishment of a secular state in Palestine is far removed from any Islamic inspiration.⁵⁸

⁵³Noel O'Sullivan, ed., Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution (Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books, Ltd., 1986), p. 5.

⁵⁴C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, The Lifestyles of Islam, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1985), p. 244.

⁵⁵David Capitanchik, "Terrorism and Islam," in O'Sullivan, ed., Terrorism, 115.

⁵⁶While the more dramatic incidents of recent decades have occurred in the Middle East, terrorism is by no means exclusive to that region nor committed by just Muslims.

⁵⁷Inspired from European sources, the PLO first sought to emulate the guerilla tactics of the Chinese and the Vietnamese Communists, when that method failed it resorted to terrorism. Capitanchik, "Terrorism and Islam," 129.

⁵⁸Ibid, 129.

E. CASE STUDIES

Being a universal religion, Islam is not confined to the Middle East and is largely concentrated in the South and Southeast Asia regions.⁵⁹ Likewise, Islamic fundamentalism extends beyond the geographic boundaries of the Middle East. From 1830 to 1920, northern India, northern Nigeria, Sumatra, Bengal, Libya, Sudan and Somalia experienced revivalist movements.⁶⁰ Today virtually every Muslim country is experiencing, in one form or another, the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism. However, only three Islamic states exist: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran.⁶¹ Most predominantly Muslim countries adopted liberal constitutions and a parliamentary system of government following independence from colonialism.⁶²

The popularity of fundamentalist ideology as a reaction to secular modernism increased in most countries during their post-independence period. The failure of both liberal and socialist paths to development, as pursued by Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran, Ayub Khan of Pakistan, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Sukarno of Indonesia, further strengthened the

⁵⁹Muslim communities exist in present-day Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, the southern Philippines and Thailand, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India have the largest Muslim populations worldwide, respectively in decreasing order of numbers.

⁶⁰See discussion in Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, 20-3.

⁶¹Islamic countries are those which declare Islam as the national religion (and ideology) and implement the Shari'a as constitutional law.

⁶²Chouieri, Islamic Fundamentalism, 55.

appeal of Islamic fundamentalism.⁶³ Fundamentalism became popular because it offered an Islamic cultural identity during a period of Muslim identity crisis. It also reintroduced Islamic principles into the social, economic and political concerns of society. The following case studies of Iran, Algeria, and Pakistan represent different examples of politically active Islamic fundamentalism.

1. Iran

Radical fundamentalists in Iran brought a deeply conservative, xenophobic and absolutist government to power in the 1978-79 revolution. The Iranian model has not been emulated by other countries. In the eyes of many fundamentalists, the Islamic Republic of Iran represents the failure of political Islam. The revolution as a whole reflected a specific Iranian national character.⁶⁴

Many circumstances that led to the triumph of Islamic revolution were unique to Iran. First, it is the only country with a predominately Shi'ite population. The Shi'ite concept of the imamate created the Iranian inclination to readily accept moral leadership by an individual,⁶⁵ as reflected in Khomeini's

⁶³Ahmad, "Nature of the Islamic Resurgence," 462.

⁶⁴Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The Fundamentalist Impact in Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and the State (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), p. 121.

⁶⁵Shi'is believe the occulted 12th Imam will return to rule the Islamic community. Iranians often referred to Ayatollah Khomeini using the honorary title of "Imam." Thomas Lippman, Politics and Religion in the Muslim World (New York: Foreign Policy Association,

relative ease in ousting the shah. Second, the reinterpretation of Shi'ism as a revolutionary ideology of mass mobilization was uncharacteristically launched by the Islamic intellectuals in Iran. Khomeini and a section of the ulama who were willing to lead a revolutionary⁶⁶ movement later employed it to gain political power. Third, Khomeini's charisma provided the primary source of success.

From 1953 to 1960, relations between the court and Iran's religious establishment were peaceful. In 1960, tensions arose when Iran's highest ranking cleric, Ayatollah Husain Burujirdi, voiced opposition to the government's proposals for land reform. After Burujirdi's death, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as the most popular religious figure when he took an increasingly militant posture toward the shah.⁶⁷ On June 4, 1963, Khomeini and some other clerics were arrested, resulting in anti-government demonstrations in several cities and the deaths of hundreds of unarmed demonstrators. After his release from prison the following year, Khomeini publically protested a bill proposing diplomatic immunity for U.S. military personnel in

1982), p. 35.

⁶⁶Militancy in Iran dates back to the medieval days of several radical religious groups, especially the Assassins. After World War II, groups combined a new type of Islamic ideology with tactics incorporating violence and assassinations. The two most influential Iranian fundamentalists were the Fida'iyān-i Islam in the 1940-50's and the Mujahidin-i Khalq from the 1960's to present. Nikki R. Keddie and Farah Monian, "Militancy and Religion in Contemporary Iran," in Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalisms and the State, 517.

⁶⁷Ibid, 517.

Iran. He strongly condemned the shah with religious rhetoric, and was exiled to Turkey in 1964.⁶⁸

Khomeini's political philosophy evolved dramatically beginning with a 1978 book entitled Islamic Government which advocated the establishment of an Iranian Republic in place of monarchy. Khomeini argued that the idea of separation of politics and religion was contrary to Islam, viewing Islam as a government of the ulama.⁶⁹ During the last months of the shah's rule, Khomeini began to call for a revolution. He argued that the Islamic revolution would pave the way for an Islamic republic. Such an Islamic republic would provide the masses an ideal society free of want, hunger, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, prostitution, corruption, political repression, and class exploitation.⁷⁰ Khomeini promised utopia to the Iranian people.

In March 1979, a national plebiscite changed Iran's political system from a hereditary monarchy to an Islamic republic. In August, an elected council of experts drafted a new constitution which was approved by another plebiscite in November 1980.⁷¹ The Islamic leaders of Iran succeeded rapidly. They

⁶⁸Ibid, 517.

⁶⁹Geoffrey C. Gunn, "Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: Rhetoric and Reality in the Middle Eastern Connection," Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 16, no. 1 (1986): 53.

⁷⁰Ervand Abrahamian, "Khomeini: A Fundamentalist?" in Kaplan, ed., Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective, 121.

⁷¹Hunter, "Islam in Power: The Case of Iran," in Politics of Islamic Revivalism, 266.

conducted a referendum in favor of an Islamic Republic, promulgated a constitution, and held elections to the presidency and parliament in a little over one year.

The large scale political participation from Iranian citizens was unprecedented. As a charismatic figure, Khomeini became a multi-faceted symbol of the Iranian population's many discontents. University students and other educated Iranians revered Khomeini as a symbol of Islamic cultural identity as well as a symbol of Iranian resistance to foreign domination. For the common man, he represented a godly man and the personification of all the traditional values violated by the Shah.⁷² Islam was a means to an end which Khomeini employed wisely.

Iran experienced profound social and cultural transformation since the establishment of the Islamic government. In the context of Khomeini's Islamic government, the Shari'a encompasses the legal system and sovereignty belongs to God. The government rewrote school books, reinterpreted Iran's history, and increased religious and Arabic instruction. Political parties function provided that they remain committed to the Islamic Republic and its constitution. People apply God's laws and live by them. University students are systematically screened and accepted on the basis of their attitudes toward Islamic ideology and knowledge of Muslim history.⁷³

⁷²Henry Munson, Islam and the Revolution in the Middle East, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 133.

⁷³Hunter, "Islam in Power," 268-9.

Khomeini argued that since both society and the regime were Islamic there was no place for those who were opposed to Islam. Under his guidance, Islamic leaders expelled all non-Islamic elements from government administration, the military, judiciary, public and private enterprises, and educational institutions. Further, alcohol and gambling were banned immediately along with nightclubs, pornographic films, and mixed bathing.⁷⁴ The U.S. embassy takeover and hostage situation in Tehran by militant students on November 4, 1979 indicated the Islamic revolution's shift toward an anti-American phase.⁷⁵ Iran focused its efforts on expelling the remaining vestiges of the American influence which dominated over the shah's actions as head of government.

Iranian politics changed significantly since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988 and Khomeini's death on June 3, 1989. The clergy has less political visibility and less direct influence over day-to-day Iranian politics. The Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has emerged as Iran's dominant political figure, proving to be a more pragmatic leader than Khomeini. The Ayatollah Ali Hoseini Khamenei replaced Khomeini as a charismatic figure in the religious leadership of Iran.⁷⁶ Khomeini takes a more hard-line public stand on most issues than Rafsanjani and

⁷⁴James Piscatori, "Iran: Revolutionary Fundamentalism in Power," in Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), p. 178.

⁷⁵Ibid, 179.

⁷⁶Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat From the Northern Gulf (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), p. 22.

acts as the voice of anti-Western orthodoxy, but he rarely seems to challenge Rafsanjani directly on any major issue.⁷⁷

Regardless, Iran's ideology and politics remain hostile to the West and its Arab allies, and secular Islamic regimes. Only some of Iran's actions and rhetoric have moderated since the death of Khomeini. Iran remains a revolutionary Islamic society with a repressive government that often takes extremist positions. Iran rejects Israel's right to exist, strongly supports extremists in civil wars, and advocates terrorism abroad. It provides ideological support and alleged funding for infiltration of other countries.⁷⁸

Iran has not given up attempting to export its particular brand of Islamic fundamentalism which translates into radicalism.⁷⁹ As Iran's campaign of exporting Islamic revolution intensified in the early 1980s, its paramilitary force, known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), formed a special Liberation Movement unit, directed by Mehdi

⁷⁷Rafsanjani and Khamenei sometimes take different public positions but have cooperated in crucial instances such as the selection of candidates for Iran's parliament in 1992. The relative position of Rafsanjani and Khamenei in terms of strategic and military power is difficult to assess. Khamenei has nominal control over the armed forces, but Rafsanjani has exerted practical authority as the leader of the Supreme Council for National Security. There are few signs of active feuding between them. Ibid, 23.

⁷⁸Iran provided support for fundamentalist groups in Sudan, Algeria, and Egypt, and encouraged Shi'ite extremist groups to launch attacks against the Lebanon Army in southern Lebanon, in an attempt to penetrate into Israel. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq, 116.

⁷⁹Ibid, 28.

Hashemi.⁸⁰ This unit initiated ties with militant groups active in Lebanon and Iran's neighboring countries.⁸¹ As a result, Iran still maintains a large number of IRGC cadre in Lebanon and Syria. Iran provides training, funds and arms to Palestinian extremist groups that attack Israel.⁸² Various militant movements in other countries have also received support.⁸³

Finally, despite intense nationalism, the Islamic revolution has brought little happiness to the Iranian people. Economic discontent and profound disappointment with the conditions of the country, fifteen years after the Shah's fall, plague society. Internationally isolated and without strong allies, Iran hardly presents an attractive model of an Islamic fundamentalist government.⁸⁴

⁸⁰Hasemi was a student activist in the Khomeini movement who had strong family and political ties with Khomeini's designated successor, Ayatollah Husain-Ali Montazeri. Keddie and Monian, "Militancy and Religion," 526.

⁸¹The emergence of a pro-Iranian Shi'i movement in Lebanon was the greatest success of Iran's campaign to export its revolution. Ibid, p. 527.

⁸²Cordesman, Iran and Iraq, 33-4. Although there is little evidence, Iran's past and active support of terrorist groups substantiates the probable existence of a formal terrorist network.

⁸³Iran extended funding and sometimes explosives to groups in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt and Turkey. Ibid, 34.

⁸⁴James Wyllie, "Iran- The Edge of the Precipice," Jane's Intelligence Review (April 1994): 177.

2. Algeria

Fundamentalism in Algeria evolved from the various brands of Islamic radicalism which have developed in the Mashreq (the Arab East) in opposition to secular nationalist regimes. The prejudices of Islamic radical movements and hostility toward secularism have also been adopted among the Algerian public.⁸⁵ The first Islamic movement started when Abdul-Hamid Ben Badis established the Algerian Ulama Association in 1931.⁸⁶ Badis introduced the teachings and reformist ideas of Mohammad Abduh in Algeria. The French colonial administration prevented expansion of Islamic reform because it stirred nationalist sentiment among the Muslim population. Later the Front for National Liberation (FLN) adopted an ideology mixing politics, culture and Islam during Algeria's war of independence from France.

After independence, Algeria experienced an Islamic reformist movement. Despite Islam's revival, Algerian President Boumediene implemented a secularly-oriented government in 1966. During his leadership, he controlled Islamic movements by using two strategies. First, the activities of extremist movements were limited. Secondly, the government arrested demonstrators to prevent violent rallies. Simultaneously, the government encouraged overt Islamic religious practices. Mosques were built in cities and small villages, and Friday replaced Sunday as the

⁸⁵Hugh Roberts, "A Trial of Strength: Algerian Islamism," Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, 139.

⁸⁶Mohammad Arkoun, "Algeria," in Hunter, ed., Politics of Islamic Revivalism, 172.

official day of rest. Religious teaching was officially introduced in all schools along with Islamic radio and television broadcasting.⁸⁷

Despite these efforts, tension and confrontation grew between the Islamic and secular (governmental) forces. In response, the Algerian government dominated over political opposition, manipulating Islam as a source of authority.⁸⁸ It has countered opposition by using religious dogma to gain social consensus for its policies since the early 1980s. The government discredited other interpretations of Islam in order to enhance its own. As a result, people began resenting the state's control over the language of Islam.

Constitutional liberalization in February 1989 allowed fundamentalism to grow. The introduction of political pluralism allowed fundamentalists to expand their popular constituency and establish numerous organizations. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) remains the largest and most influential political party today. Founded in 1989, it emerged as a major force capable of mass mobilization, possessing impressive national organization and appeal. While the FIS supports the government's policy of liberalizing the economy, it is first and foremost a fundamentalist movement that seeks to reconstitute the Algerian polity on the basis of the Shari'a and ijima in place of the

⁸⁷Ibid, 173.

⁸⁸Ibid, 180.

Western concept of representative democracy.⁸⁹

The country's current troubles began in 1990 when FIS won the bulk of the districts in the local elections. The following December (1991), FIS consolidated its position by winning the first round of the general election. The military leadership was so stunned by the FIS victory that they took over the government. In effect, the Algerian Army, commanded by strongly nationalist officers, decided that the preservation of Algeria's national sovereignty could not be entrusted to the increasing influence of the Islamic leadership.⁹⁰

On February 9, 1992, a state of emergency was declared.⁹¹ Further, the military canceled elections to prevent another fundamentalist or FIS political victory. Since then, political terrorism under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism haunts Algeria. Neighboring countries fear that the formation of an Islamic state in Algeria, like Iran, would provide a source of arms and funding for militants in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and elsewhere.⁹²

FIS splintered into a number of violent extremist groups.⁹³

⁸⁹Roberts, "A Trial Of Strength," 135.

⁹⁰Ibid, 152.

⁹¹Jane's Defense Weekly. "Global Update: Algeria," (1994): 3-5.

⁹²Todd Shields, "The Battle of Algeria," U.S. News & World Report (August 22, 1994): 44.

⁹³It must be pointed out that numerous other fundamentalist groups that are not radical exist in Algeria. For example, the revivalist Movement for an Islamic Society (HAMAS), evolved from a previously non-political Islamic association in 1990. It contrasts

The FIS armed wing is known as the Salvation Army which is rivalled by the hard-line Armed Islamic Group (GIA).⁹⁴ The Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) represents another faction that controls the area behind Algiers while GIA bases its operations around the capital. Unlike GIA, MIA considers dialogue a method of negotiating with the regime.

Terrorist tactics first entailed use of urban violence but have since changed to rural insurgency nationwide.⁹⁵ International terrorism more recently entered the Algerian radicals' repertoire. One of its more dramatic terrorist actions, GIA claimed responsibility for the December 1994 Air France hijacking.⁹⁶ The GIA has effectively discredited and destabilized the Algerian government. It is credited with terrorism directed against foreigners since 1993. With no apparent end in sight, the civil war between secular and Islamic forces continues. Foreign nationals and Algerian intellectuals remain the primary targets of radical fundamentalists in Algeria today.

FIS in its emphasis on societal reform through Islamic missionary activity. Additionally, the Movement of the Islamic Renaissance (MNI), like HAMAS, is close in spirit and outlook to the Muslim Brotherhood although not organizationally linked to it. The MNI strongly opposes liberal economic reforms unlike the FIS and HAMAS. See Roberts, "A Trial Of Strength," 137.

⁹⁴Jane's Defense Weekly, 4.

⁹⁵Ibid, 4.

⁹⁶See Thomas Sanction, "Anatomy Of a Hijack," Time (January 9, 1995): 54-7.

3. Pakistan

Pakistan is the second largest Muslim nation in population, after Indonesia. Unlike countries with centuries of pre-Islamic history, Pakistan began its nationhood as an Islamic state in 1947. It was created by the Muslims of India who advocated the formation of a separate nation because of their religion and culture. To many Pakistani intellectuals, Islam constitutes the *raison d'être* of statehood and the only justification for a separate existence from India. The Jama'at-i-Islami, the largest fundamentalist organization in Pakistan, emphasized the essential relationship between Islam and Pakistan by stating: "Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam and it could exist in the name of Islam alone."⁹⁷

The core fundamentalist ideas of Jama'at-i-Islami are the restoration of the original teachings of the Qur'an and Sunna, and the recreation of the socio-religious system established by Mohammad and his first four successors. The Jama'at criticizes the conservative ulama for reducing Islam to the five pillars of faith. Its members interpret Islam as a way of life which covers the entire spectrum of human activity be it social, economic or political. They also seek to replace the folk and popular practices of Sufism with the rituals of orthodox Islam.

Compared with its Iranian counterpart, Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan has been accommodationist in its ideological orientation. The Jama'at-i-Islami has upheld

⁹⁷Ahmad, "Pakistan," 232.

constitutional and legal methods to achieve its Islamic objectives. At the outset, it advocated a policy of peaceful transition to achieving an Islamic state and publicly disapproved the violent methods adopted by some Middle Eastern fundamentalist groups.⁹⁸ While the government has been against both the right and left wing radicals that periodically emerge, it has never been as repressive as the Iranian regime. As a result, religious political groups in Pakistan generally pursue normal political activities over those radical and violent in nature. Additionally, Pakistani Islamic groups do not exist on the fringe but are very much in the mainstream of Islamic religious thought.⁹⁹

Finally, Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan has followed the philosophical positions of Mohammad Iqbal and Abdul al-Ala Mawdudi, founder of the Jama'at-i-Islami, rather than those of Sayyid Qutb and Ayatollah Khomeini. Mawdudi's and Iqbal's major targets of attack were the Muslim kings, the ulama and the Sufis not the West. They hoped Islamic fundamentalism would better educate people and ultimately triumph in the creation of a moral democracy. The prospects for a permanent and lasting Islamic society could then be achieved through gradual and balanced change. Mawdudi also taught that the intellectual, scientific and technological progress of the West represented an extension

⁹⁸Ibid, 239.

⁹⁹Ibid, 240.

of the principles first propounded by Islam.¹⁰⁰ Thus, compared to Iran and Algeria, as a whole Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan does not appear to have a destabilizing effect on the country's political stability.

¹⁰⁰Ibid, 241.

III. ISLAM'S HISTORICAL ROLE IN INDONESIA

"Islam did not construct a civilization,
it appropriated one."

- Clifford Geertz¹⁰¹

Indonesia's approximately 185 million Muslims constitute the world's largest Islamic population in a single country. The nature and political role of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia is affected by the country's historical, cultural, and sociopolitical characteristics rather than by universal Islamic principles. While Indonesians share common beliefs with the Muslims in the Middle East, Islam is not the central feature of Indonesia's political system. For President Soeharto and his New Order government, Pancasila has always acted as the ideological tool of legitimacy.

A. HISTORICAL HERITAGE

Islam was drawn to Indonesia by trade expansion and it spread relatively peacefully through the country.¹⁰² From the eleventh century, or possibly earlier, merchants introduced Islam along the coasts of Java and Sumatra.¹⁰³ Starting in northern

¹⁰¹Geertz, Islam Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 11.

¹⁰²Although there is no evidence of foreign military expeditions imposing Islam on Indonesia, it spread to some areas by warfare within. See M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia (Indiana: Bloomington University Press, 1981), chap. 1.

¹⁰³Islam may have entered Indonesia as early as the 7th or 8th century. See Uka Tjandrasasmita, "The Introduction of Islam and the Growth of Moslem Coastal Cities in the Indonesian Archipelago," in Haryati Soebadio and Carine A. Due Marchie Sarvaas, eds., Dynamics of Indonesian History (New York: North Holland Publishing Co, 1978), pp. 141-3.

Sumatra, Islam spread as far as the spice-producing islands of East Indonesia. It firmly planted itself in the areas along the early international trade routes: the Sumatran shores of the Straits of Malacca, the Malay peninsula, the northern coast of Java, Brunei, Sulu and Maluku (Moluccas).¹⁰⁴ Thus the Muslim traders from Arabia, Persia and India played a significant role in the spread of Islam.

The Indonesians found Islam acceptable as long as it mixed with their old religious practices and beliefs. In Aceh, the early Muslims established small villages without encountering any strong central power hostile to Islam.¹⁰⁵ By the end of the thirteenth century, many Muslims resided in Sumatran ports, maintaining close contacts with other trading posts and Indian Muslims. The Javanese began converting to Islam in the fourteenth century.¹⁰⁶ Sufism easily combined with the animistic, indigenous religions of Java. In the non-Javanese areas, Islam remained largely confined to the coastal areas.

Upon the decline of Hindu-based kingdoms in Indonesia,¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴Ricklefs, History Of Modern Indonesia, 8.

¹⁰⁵Abdurrahman Wahid, "Developments of Islam in Southeast Asia," Indonesian Quarterly vol. 14, no. 1 (Jakarta, 1986): 131.

¹⁰⁶The first clear evidence of Javanese Muslims is provided by the gravestones of aristocrats Trawulan and Tralaya on East Java, dated 1368. Ricklefs, "Islamization in Java," in Raphael Israeli and Anthony H. Johns, eds., Southeast and East Asia: Islam in Asia, vol. 2 (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), p. 11.

¹⁰⁷The fall of the Majapahit kingdom, in particular, allowed Islam to better establish itself. By mid-14th century, Majapahit included the islands between Java and New Guinea, Sumatra, Borneo, Sulawesi, West Molucca and most of the Malay peninsula. Reuven

the Sufi version of Islam easily filled the power vacuum. A small group of religious activists in the upper classes of village society began practicing Islam. This spread to large groups of economic and judicial peddlers who utilized Islam to serve the interests of a coalition between merchants and local rulers.¹⁰⁸ As a result, Islamic mysticism made a considerable impact on the Indonesians. Sufis were highly regarded and honored. In northern Sumatra, the most respected religious scholars were mystics. Likewise in Java the Islamic theologians and jurists of Middle Eastern origin took second seat in influence to the Sufis.¹⁰⁹

Islam spread to the local population through educational institutions called pesantrens. Pesantrens are similar to military academies in the sense that those taking part in it experience total immersion.¹¹⁰ Scholars, teachers of Islam (kiais) and religious leaders in the community were educated in pesantrens, and often established their own (pesantrens) using the vehicles of Sufism to introduce Islam.¹¹¹ Further

Kahane, "The Unique Pattern of Indonesian Islam," in Israeli and Johns, eds., Southeast and East Asia, 175.

¹⁰⁸Ibid, 181.

¹⁰⁹Mystics and Sufis were most influential in these areas during the last half of the 16th century. Howard Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 2.

¹¹⁰Abdurrahman Wahid, "Principles of Pesantren Education," Seminar Paper, Berlin (July 9-12, 1987), p. 1.

¹¹¹Tjandrasasmita, "Introduction Of Islam," 151-3.

dissemination of the Islamic faith occurred primarily through intermarriage between Muslim merchants and the Indonesian women. Before marriage the women were converted to Islam which often encouraged (the woman's) family members to also convert to Islam.¹¹²

When Europeans first arrived in Southeast Asia during the 1500s, Islam had not yet gained mass appeal among Indonesians. The establishment of Portuguese, Dutch and British colonial rule in the region, shortly after the introduction of Islam, severely impacted the new religion. In 1619, the Dutch East India Company established an outpost at Batavia¹¹³, becoming a preeminent political force and overtaking Indonesia's overseas trade. The increasing penetration of Dutch colonialism accelerated the diffusion of Islam throughout Java and Sumatra. Muslim conversions increased in reaction to the threat posed by Christianity and the European missionaries who opposed Islam. Islam served as a rallying point against the foreign invaders, unifying the Indonesians through revolts and uprisings against Dutch colonization.

Despite the commonality of faith, Muslims in Indonesia and the Middle East remain a divided community. In principle, all

¹¹²P.A. Hoesein Djajadiningrat, "Islam in Indonesia," in Morgan, ed., Islam - The Straight Path, 381.

¹¹³Java's present-day Jakarta

Indonesian Muslims are Sunnis who follow the Shafi'i¹¹⁴ school of law. However, Indonesian Islam has more in common with Asian Hindu-Buddhism than with Middle Eastern Islam. The Javanese absorbed Islamic concepts and practices in the same fashion that Asian folk religion absorbed Indian influences.¹¹⁵ The Sundanese who occupy the western third of Java are much more orthodox in their Islamic beliefs. The Indonesians themselves usually say the most observant Muslims are found in Aceh (northern Sumatra) and in southern Sulawesi.¹¹⁶ Likewise, the Muslims in Sumatra believe they practice a more pure Islam than what is found in Java.¹¹⁷ The remainder of the population is devoted to local spirits, domestic rituals and charms which vary from group to group and geographic location. Indic religious traditions continue, stripped (except in Bali) of its ritual expression but not of its roots in Javanese culture.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴One of the four orthodox schools of traditional Islam, founded in the Middle East during the late 8th and early 9th centuries. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 160.

¹¹⁵Geertz, Islam Observed, 13.

¹¹⁶Keith Loveard, "Journey Through Magic," Asiaweek (June 9, 1993): 39.

¹¹⁷The word "orthodox" denotes a negative connotation when used in regard to Indonesian Islam. A better description would be the phrase "pure Islam" which describes a different level of devoutness found in every individual. Dras. Sri Minda Murni, M.S., Lecturer at Medan University and Idjah, M.A., Lecturer at University of North Sumatra. Interviews in Medan, Sumatra, January 22, 1995.

¹¹⁸Geertz, Islam Observed, 66.

Javanese cultural legacies such as the wayang¹¹⁹ and the Hindu-Buddhist literary classics are practiced in Indonesia even today.¹²⁰

B. ADAPTATION OF ISLAM IN INDONESIA

The common Indonesian has superficial knowledge of the fundamental beliefs of traditional Islam covered in Chapter I. The Islamic belief in good and evil affords the opportunity for pre-Islamic Indonesian beliefs in invisible beings and spirits to continue. For example, the Javanese believe in the guardian spirit of the village who dwells in a tree while the Sundanese worship Lady Dewi Sri, the personification of a rice kernel, to ensure a rich harvest.¹²¹ Virtually everything in Java is hedged by superstition rooted in ancient fables.¹²² Some

¹¹⁹An integral part of Indonesian life, theatrical performances in "wayang wong" played by actors, "wayang golek" using puppets, or the most popular "wayang kulit" as a shadow-play with two-dimensional puppets. Figures from Hindu epics share the stage with ancient Javanese kings and wicked foreign invaders. Current issues are also addressed in some plays. Benjamin with Jean Higgins, in Indonesia: The Crisis of the Millstones (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1963), p. 41. See also Bill Dalton's descriptions in Indonesia (Illinois: Passport Books, 1989), pp. 93-5.

¹²⁰Ricklefs, "Islamization in Java," 11-12.

¹²¹Djajadiningrat, "Islam in Indonesia," 386.

¹²²For example, Indonesians believe that it is bad luck to visit the 10th century temple of Prambanan with your fiancée. The daughter of King Boko, Loro Jaonggrang, tasked her suitor to build 1,000 temples in a single night before she agreed to wed. The suitor, assisted by spirits, successfully completed 999 when the resourceful princess ordered servants to prepare rice. Seeing breakfast prepared and assuming it was dawn, the roosters crowed, scaring away the daylight-fearing spirits. The suitor was unable to finish; however, Prambanan was one of the temples built. Visit to Prambanan Hindu temple. Central Java. January 27, 1995.

Muslims believe that the air is full of djinns, or genies. Organizers of a major Muslim rally in Jakarta in March 1992 claimed that 2,500 djinns acted as spiritual policemen to maintain control over the crowd.¹²³

Traditional Javanese beliefs are called Kejawen,¹²⁴ but have not been recognized as a religion in Indonesia since the 1970s.¹²⁵ Kejawen accommodates the animistic beliefs that prevailed before the arrival of Buddhism. Dewi Sri is balanced by Popo Okoso, father of heaven, who together create fertility.¹²⁶ Javanese mystics considered orthodox Islam inferior to their type of Islam, and introduced a doctrine which departed from traditional Islam. They regarded the world as unreal, and to understand its distinctions between God and man could not exist.¹²⁷ Javanese Muslims therefore associated man and God as "one" whereas traditional Islam teaches that God is transcendent and untouched by man (his creation).¹²⁸

Of the Five Pillars of Islam, the salat is probably the most practiced by Indonesians. Throughout Indonesia at any of the five allotted times for prayer, Muslims can be seen in mosques

¹²³Loveard, "Journey," 41.

¹²⁴Javanese beliefs are also known as kebatinan.

¹²⁵Loveard, "Journey," 38.

¹²⁶Ibid, 44.

¹²⁷Ricklefs, "Islamization of Java," 21.

¹²⁸Ibid, 18.

performing salat together.¹²⁹ Fridays and special services during Ramadan are particularly crowded. Concerning zakat, Indonesians primarily give to the poor during the festival following Ramadan.¹³⁰ As in other countries, sawm during the month of Ramadan is only observed by the devout.¹³¹ Regardless, nightly religious meetings at the mosques during Ramadan are often attended by those not participating in the fast. Over the years, the hajj has become increasingly important. Indonesia sends the most pilgrims out of all Muslim countries.¹³² Next to the salat, this is an obligation all Indonesian Muslims try their best to fulfill.

The advent of Islam and the formation of the (universal) Muslim community in Indonesia, known as the Ummat Islam, took over six centuries. In the seventeenth century, the Javanese Muslims considered Ummat Islam to mean universalism via trade and use of the Arabic language. At the end of the nineteenth

¹²⁹The people of Lombok, the island beyond Bali, belong to a sect that requires the ritual prayers to be performed only three times a day. Djajadiningrat, "Islam In Indonesia," 385.

¹³⁰The donor buys the amount of rice which is determined for each person and presents it as zakat to a religious teacher, usually the teacher of his children. Today, committees are organized in the big cities to collect money from families and distribute gifts to the poor. Ibid, 386.

¹³¹Some deliberately fast only on the first day, referred to by the Javanese as "fasting like the bedug," which is a drum covered only on one side. Others fast on the first and last day similar to the skins covering both sides of a kendang drum. Ibid, 386.

¹³²In May 1995, a quota of 194,000 was filled at a cost of \$1000 per Indonesian. Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, Minister of Religious Affairs. Jakarta interview, January 19, 1995.

century, the definition of Ummat Islam became narrower and confined to those Muslims who spoke Malay. In contemporary Indonesia, Ummat Islam can be identified in five ways: those who regard themselves as adherents of Islam, practice the Five Pillars, have knowledge of Islamic teachings, conform their behavior to suit Islamic teachings within society, and regard Islam an ideological basis.¹³³

Once introduced to Indonesia, Islam became full of heterodoxy and heresy. This diversification of traditional Islam was largely due to ignorance. As technological advances in the nineteenth century made travel to Mecca less arduous, the number of pilgrims significantly increased. Indonesians then encountered orthodox Islam in the Arabian peninsula, and became acquainted with reformist ideas such as those of Egyptian modernist Mohammad Abduh.¹³⁴ He founded Islamic modernism which advocated breaking free from the domination of the four Sunni schools of law and returning to the original authoritative sources of Islam.¹³⁵ In doing such, Abduh reasoned that the scientific advances of modern (Western) learning, combined with a purified Islam, could raise the Islamic world out of its

¹³³Rohani Abdul Rahim, Muslims in Indonesia and the Notion of An Islamic State (Jakarta: Dewan Pustaka Islam, 1991), p. 20.

¹³⁴Manning Nash, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia," in Marty and Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed, 716.

¹³⁵As discussed in Chapter I, these four religious sources are the Qur'an, Hadith, Sunna, and Shari'a.

decline.¹³⁶

As a result, Java experienced increasing conflict between Indonesians returning from the hajj and the Dutch rulers. Muslim zealots considered Dutch domination over Indonesia the result of Islam's decline, observing a widespread need for reform. Consequently, the relative unity of the Muslims disintegrated. They divided themselves into two groups: those of the santri and the abangan. Santri are the devout Muslims or firm believers while the majority Indonesian Muslim population prefer the less devout attitude and lifestyles as abangan. The santri sought the purification of Indonesian (abangan) Islam.¹³⁷ The melding of Islam with pre-Islamic religious practices led to a rift between the syncretic abangan and devout santri.

The Dutch distrusted Islam and attempted to restrict hajj pilgrimage traffic to Mecca. Around 1902 Dutch policy changed to accept Islam as a religious doctrine and encouraged the hajj.¹³⁸

¹³⁶Ricklefs, History Of Modern Indonesia, 160.

¹³⁷Santri and abangan classifications were derived from Clifford Geertz's anthropologic research in the early 1960's. Present day Muslim scholars in Indonesia argue that these classifications no longer apply. Dr. H. Munawir Sjadzali, Member Supreme Advisory Council and former Minister of Religious Affairs and Dr. Mochtar Pabottingi, Director of Center for Political and Religious Studies, LIPI Indonesian Institute of Sciences. Jakarta, January 18 and 20, 1995, respectively.

¹³⁸Dutch scholars Van Deventer and Snouck Hurgronje's work on the role of religion and custom in Indonesian society liberalized Dutch policy with the "Ethical Policy" in 1899. Once implemented, it encouraged some aspects of Islamic religious activity, such as the hajj and educational programs since they increased orthodox religious belief. Donald M. Seekins, "Historical Setting," in U.S. Department of the Army, ed., Indonesia: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 28.

The Dutch reasoned that closer adherence to Islamic orthodoxy would lessen the chance for fanatical religious beliefs inimical to their rule.¹³⁹ However, Muslim law became unacceptable on the grounds that judicial administration should rest on the local mores and Indonesian customs (adat) of the area. The Dutch favored adat over the Shari'a, and remained wary of Islam appearing as a political force.

C. EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC FACTOR IN POLITICS

Indonesian politics reflected a constant struggle between two political cultures: political Islam versus Pancasila.¹⁴⁰ Islam became the focus for politics entering the twentieth century, corresponding with the rise of nationalism. Historically, Muslims take pride in the fact that the first national mass movement in Indonesia was spearheaded by Sarekat Islam¹⁴¹ under the leadership of Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto in 1912. This Muslim party originated from the many local social and economic organizations, stemming from the Islamic Trading Organization of 1911. Upon uniting into a single political party, Sarekat Islam protested Dutch colonialism and imperialism, and successfully rallied people under the banner of Islam for a

¹³⁹Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, 8.

¹⁴⁰Leo Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's GOLKAR (Ohio: CSIS, 1989), p. 72.

¹⁴¹Sarekat Islam is translated into English (from Indonesian) as "Islamic Union" in Fazana Shaikh, ed., "Indonesia," Islam and Islamic Groups: A World Reference Guide (UK: Longman Group UK, Ltd, 1992), p. 101.

short duration.¹⁴² In a later phase of national consciousness, the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia combined with other nationalist parties to adopt the principle of "non-cooperation," inspired by Gandhi and the Indian National Congress.¹⁴³ Legislative or political cooperation with the Dutch was rejected. Consequently, Islam did not have a voice in the government until Japan took over Dutch rule.

Islam's position was strengthened under Japanese occupation with the provision of an official organization known as Masjumi. The Japanese recognized the importance a religion could have on society, such as their own which is imbedded with Confucian, Buddhist and Shinto values. As a result, they encouraged the formation of Masjumi as a nonpolitical Muslim organization to avoid religious confrontation with their rule over Indonesia.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴²Sarekat Islam's downfall was caused by fragmentation. After the Russian revolution, the leadership split into factions on the issue of socialism versus Islam. Many members formed a more militant and radical organization known as the Sarekat Islam Merah (Red Union) which eventually became the Communist party in 1921. Rosihan Anwar, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia," Robert O. Tilman, ed., Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1969), p. 117.

¹⁴³W.F. Wertheim, "Indonesian Moslems Under Sukarno and Suharto: Majority with Minority Mentality," B.B. Hering, ed., Studies On Indonesian Islam (Queensland: University of North Queensland, 1987), p. 111.

¹⁴⁴The Japanese, like the Dutch, discouraged the wedding of Islam and politics. However, of note, the highest non-Japanese position in the military administration went to Dr. Hoesein Djajadiningrat, a Muslim who later became the first head of the Bureau of Religious Affairs in 1943. His appointment helped shape a favorable Muslim response to the Japanese occupation, giving great symbolic significance to the role of Islam in Indonesia. Anwar, "Islam and Politics," 118.

In 1945, after the Japanese surrender, Masjumi transformed into a political party. However, the most experienced politicians, like Sukarno, were secular nationalists.¹⁴⁵

Western (Dutch) thinking influenced the formation of Indonesia's current political system which separates religion from government. The Constitution of 1945 instituted a republican and unitary political system. It established legislative, judicial and executive branches of government with the presidency as the central focus of power. The president is selected for a five year term by the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat (MPR), the Indonesian Congress or People's Consultative Assembly. A parliament, the Dewan Perwakilan Rajkat (DPR), also exists.¹⁴⁶ In theory, the MPR acts as the highest national power.¹⁴⁷ In practice, the Indonesian president holds ultimate governmental authority.

Far from being an Islamic or religious state, Indonesia bases its constitution on a national ideology known as Pancasila.¹⁴⁸ Pancasila's five principles of nationalism,

¹⁴⁵Tensions between the Communists and Muslim groups culminated in the Madiun rebellion of 1948, resulting in many casualties between the two groups. Wertheim, "Moslems Under Sukarno and Suharto," 115.

¹⁴⁶William R. Liddle, Power, Participation and the Political Parties in Indonesia (Cambridge: MIT Center for International Studies, 1974), p. 185.

¹⁴⁷Rinn-Sup Shinn, "Government and Politics," in U.S. Dept of the Army, ed., Indonesia: A Country Study, 180.

¹⁴⁸Pancasila originated from the two Sanskrit (Hindu) words: panca and sila. Panca means five, while sila means moral obligations. Kirdi Dipoyudo, "Pancasila the Morality of Indonesian

humanitarianism, democracy, social welfare, and belief in one god provide a unifying moral framework for Indonesia's diverse population. Such principles were created to unify the major cleavages in Indonesian society: Islam and Christianity, aristocracy and peasantry, nationalist and Communist, commercial and agrarian, Javanese and outer island groups.¹⁴⁹

Of the world religions, Islam insists upon a direct relationship between religion and government. So much so, that traditional Islam does not differentiate between religion and political power. The question of religion's role in Indonesia was originally addressed on June 22, 1945 by the Jakarta Charter which declared:

The constitution of the Indonesian state which is to exist in the form of the Republic of Indonesia, and to be based upon the sovereignty of the people, is founded on the following principles: Belief in one God, with the moral obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law, the principle of righteous and moral humanitarianism; the unity of Indonesia, and democracy led by the mutual deliberations of a representative body which will lead to social justice for the entire people.¹⁵⁰

However, the Jakarta Charter was abandoned after Indonesia

People," Indonesian Quarterly, vol 15, no. 4 (Jakarta, 1987): 579.

¹⁴⁹Cited in Allan A. Samson, "Concepts of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam," Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley: University California Press, 1978), p. 37; originally taken from Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 68.

¹⁵⁰Anthony Johns, "Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism," in John L. Esposito, ed., Islam in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 210.

formally declared independence on August 17, 1945. In particular, the phrase "with the moral obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law" was deleted from the constitutional text to the dismay of the devout Muslims.¹⁵¹

In place of the Jakarta Charter, the preamble to the 1945 Constitution established Pancasila as the philosophical basis of independent Indonesia on August 18, 1945. This was done after much debating and careful deliberation by the Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence¹⁵² who represented the entire Indonesian population.¹⁵³ The general debate over the identity of the new nation was between three groups favoring different solutions. The santri wanted an Islamic state; the nationalist Muslims supported a multi-religious state based on Pancasila; and the Christians (also in favor of Pancasila) sought religious freedom and a separation between religion and state. Ideology was disputed primarily by the Muslim factions with the Christians intervening when their religious freedom seemed at stake. Pancasila offered a middle road to reconcile the differing opinions, and was discussed until unanimously approved.

¹⁵¹To view the constitution's text see Gerald A. McBeath, Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Indonesia (New York: Ocean Publications, Inc., 1973).

¹⁵²Founded in March 1945, it included delegates representing the outer islands of the archipelago (not just Java). Also referred to as the Investigating Committee for the Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence. Seekins, "Historical Setting," 41.

¹⁵³Kirdi Dipoyudo, "Pancasila the State Basis and View of Life of the Indonesian People," Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4 (Jakarta, 1987): 538.

The first president, Bung Sukarno, personified Indonesia's aspirations as the father of Indonesia and creator of Pancasila. From the 1920s, he became the articulator of an evolving Indonesian identity, striking a responsive chord among the masses. Sukarno stood for independence from the Dutch, liberation from Japanese occupation, and resistance against the Dutch who tried reasserting control over the archipelago from 1945 to 1949. As president, he enjoyed widespread support among all levels of society. Acclaimed Indonesian author Pramoedya Ananta Toer remembers Sukarno as "the one person in history who united a country not by blood, but just by his speeches."¹⁵⁴

Under Sukarno's leadership, parliamentary democracy existed from 1950 to 1957. During this time, the military enlarged its political role. The ABRI institutionalized "dwi fungsi" (dual function) as a national concept which legitimized its role as both a military and a sociopolitical force in Indonesia.¹⁵⁵ In July 1959, Sukarno introduced an authoritarian regime called Guided Democracy. Under this system, parliament's power declined along with the role of the political parties. Nevertheless, the Communist Party (PKI) increasingly played a more significant political role. The PKI, Sukarno and the Army constituted the three major national influences in Indonesia by the early

¹⁵⁴Keith Loveard, "Sukarno: A Fallen Hero's Legacy," Asiaweek (June 29, 1994): 36.

¹⁵⁵For detailed discussion of dwi fungsi see M. Kharis Suhud, LTGen, ABRI And Democracy In Indonesia (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1988), pp. 1-30.

1960s.¹⁵⁶

Sukarno's attitude toward Islam was somewhat ambiguous. He interpreted Muslim scripture and law in a manner alarming to orthodoxy and the ulama of traditional Islam. Like Ataturk in Turkey, he advocated the establishment of a secular rather than Islamic state. In a 1941 speech, Sukarno advocated the mixing of three "isms": Islamism, nationalism, and Marxism.¹⁵⁷ The method in which the abangan culture absorbed Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, and Western ideas into a unique synthesis provided a model for Sukarno to shape Pancasila as the Indonesian national philosophy.¹⁵⁸ Sukarno's immense popularity allowed him to develop a political system that absorbed three philosophical traditions: Islam, Javanese mysticism of the Buddhist-Hindu past, and Westernization derived from his Dutch schooling.¹⁵⁹

After sovereignty in 1949, the Muslims supported Pancasila as the symbol of Indonesian national unity. However, by 1953 Islamic leaders began expressing distinct political interests such as replacing the civil codes and adat with the Shari'a. Two basic viewpoints prevailed among the Muslims regarding how Islamic principles and behavior should be placed into practice in

¹⁵⁶Wertheim points out that "during the period of Guided Democracy, two big forces were contending for power, the Army and the Communists" with Suharto acting as a third powerful factor to keep the balance, "Moslems Under Sukarno and Suharto," 117.

¹⁵⁷Seekins, "Historical Setting," 37-8.

¹⁵⁸Ricklefs, History of Modern Indonesia, 173.

¹⁵⁹Loveard, "Sukarno," 30-1.

Indonesian society. The revivalist Muhammadiyah movement felt that a society based on Islamic principles and practices was of utmost importance, and such a society would eventually develop an operative Islamic system of law.¹⁶⁰ The resurgent Nahdatul Ulama (NU) movement believed that the declaration of an Islamic state must proceed the creation of an Islamic society.¹⁶¹ Regardless of which view they supported, most politically active Muslim groups were falsely convinced that the ultimate establishment of an Islamic state (negara Islam) could be achieved by democratic means in the Republic of Indonesia.¹⁶² Heated debates on Islam's role continued well into 1959.

As Indonesian Muslims began advocating more orthodox practices, heterodoxy began to evaporate.¹⁶³ Education and closer adherence to Islam of the Middle East brought about the birth of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. Fundamentalism traces back to the colonial period from 1900 to 1942, beginning

¹⁶⁰Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, 164.

¹⁶¹NU constituency was more Javanese culture-oriented and anti-foreign, an outlook largely determined by peasants, rich landowners, and small traders in Central and East Java. Wertheim, "Moslems Under Sukarno and Suharto," 116.

¹⁶²The Muslim groups also incorrectly expected Masjumi, banished during the last years of Sukarno's regime, would be revived under Soeharto's New Order. Finally prior to the 1971 elections, Soeharto approved the creation of a new Muslim party, Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi or PMI), under the condition that former prominent Masjumi leaders were prohibited from playing an active role. Ibid, 118.

¹⁶³See Clifford Geertz, "Tradition, Modernity, and Social Change," in Robert O. Tilman, ed., Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1969), p. 204.

with Islamic revivalism. Revivalism coincided with Middle Eastern modernist movements. At the turn of the century, several Indonesian Islamic scholars introduced reformist ideas emphasizing the importance of educational and social movements. These ideas advocated teaching orthodoxy, essentially reviving the traditional Islamic faith in the daily lives of Indonesians. At the same time, modernity was introduced to the education sector. Modernized teaching methods employed a system of classes, tuition, the use of desks and an organized curriculum, complementing the study of Islam in schools.

Indonesia began experiencing a reassertion of Islam in politics characteristic of the fundamentalist movement known as Islamic resurgence. This movement coincided with a new wave of activism beginning in the 1970s to present, reflecting increased Muslim religious, social, and political awareness. Activities included Quranic study circles and back-to-the-mosque movements. After a decrease in the 1950s and 1960s, a large number of Muslims traveled the hajj again in the 1980s.¹⁶⁴ Close to every one Indonesian in a thousand¹⁶⁵ now travels the pilgrimage.¹⁶⁶

Other indications of Islamic resurgence include the birth of Islamic groups in many mosques, propounding a range of political

¹⁶⁴Nash, "Islamic Resurgence," 726.

¹⁶⁵A substantial number considering the total population of Indonesia exceeds 200 million. See CIA, The World Factbook 1994 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 157.

¹⁶⁶Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, Minister of Religious Affairs. Jakarta interview, January 19, 1995.

ideas and sharply criticizing governmental policy. Additionally, the number of Islamic boarding schools and mosques during the New Order period increased.¹⁶⁷ Today women are more likely to wear conservative Islamic dress than in the past, and Muslims are becoming conscientious about the foods they consume.¹⁶⁸

The Muhammadiyah, the most important institutional expression of Islamic thought in Indonesia, was established in Jogjakarta on November 18, 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan.¹⁶⁹ It dedicated itself to spreading Islam among the population and promoting social services. Dahlan disliked the way Islamic ritual and teaching had been impregnated with Javanese custom and wanted to restore Quranic purity. As a result, Muhammadiyah advocated better education with a distinct Islamic spirit.¹⁷⁰ Avoiding politics, the Muhammadiyah established educational institutions, mosques and Islamic publications. By 1920, branches were established through Java as well as the outer

¹⁶⁷In Jakarta alone there were about 400 mosques in 1965 which increased to 1,600 by 1989. Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, 129.

¹⁶⁸Nash, "Islamic Resurgence," 726.

¹⁶⁹The founders of the Muhammadiyah were predominately santri kraton (holy men of the Javanese courts). These were the men who served as religious officials in the traditional Javanese courts in Jogjakarta and Solo. Following the advent of Islam, the Javanese priyayi or aristocracy always retained santri officials to perform religious duties in their courts. All the founding fathers of the Muhammadiyah bore the distinguished title of "haji" meaning that they performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Indonesia Human Rights Campaign (TAPOL), Indonesia: Muslims on Trial (Jakarta: TAPOL, 1987), p. 3.

¹⁷⁰Ibid, 4.

islands.¹⁷¹

Islamic revivalism in its Indonesian context has had two goals pursued the most effectively by the Muhammadijah movement. First, revivalism seeks to purify the religion by returning to the four sources of Islam. This goal seemingly divides the Muhammadijah from the modernist Muslims by linking Indonesian Islam more closely than before to the intellectual and political currents in the Middle East.¹⁷²

Second, the Muhammadijah also advocates a closer relationship between Islam and the state. Although seldom politically activist in nature, the Muhammadijah contributed ideas to the Masjumi party in the 1950s and was strongly associated with its commitment to creating an Indonesian Islamic state.¹⁷³ When Masjumi was banned in 1960, Muhammadijah ceased even indirect political activity.

In 1926, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) formed in response to the Muhammadijah's reformist movement under Hasjim Asjari's leadership. It represented a conservative reaction to the growing strength of reformism and the rapid spread of Muhammadijah schools posing a threat to the village-based

¹⁷¹Within the next two decades, Muhammadijah's popularity increased. It reported 852 branches with over 250,000 members, 1,774 schools, and two medical clinics in 1938. Additionally, it maintained 834 mosques and 31 public libraries. Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 83.

¹⁷²William R. Liddle, Politics and Culture In Indonesia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988), p. 11.

¹⁷³Ibid, 12.

pesantrens. NU Muslims labeled themselves traditionalists, believing that reform undermined the traditional authority of the ulama. The core constituency consists of rural pesantrens found primarily in East and Central Java.

NU formed to protect the existing Islamic way of life in Indonesia which combined devoutness with narrow political horizons. Unlike Muhammadiyah, its history of Islamic political activism makes it resurgent in nature. NU was initially in Masjumi but it broke away in 1952, establishing itself as a political party. NU supported Sukarno on issues, believing that it could increase its political influence and gain representation among the political leadership.¹⁷⁴ It remained in politics until 1984 when its leaders decided to shift goals and focus on the purely social and educational aspects of Islam. Regardless, NU remains active behind the scenes in both partisan and bureaucratic politics today.¹⁷⁵

Islamic radicalism in Indonesia characteristically revolved around two movements known as Persatuan Islam and Darul Islam. Islamic revivalists founded the Persatuan Islam movement on September 12, 1923 in Bandung. It was an effort by several Muslims to encourage Islamic religious study and activity.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴In reality, Nahdatul Ulama was easily controllable and taken for granted. Allan A. Samson, "Army and Islam in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, vol. 44, no. 4 (Winter 1971-72): 548.

¹⁷⁵Liddle, "Politics and Culture," 12.

¹⁷⁶These Muslims were Sundandese, the dominant ethnic group in the West Java region. Initial membership was less than 20 persons with Muslims representing both the NU and Muhammadiyah factions.

Persatuan Islam's discussions centered not so much on actual religious teachings as on the new reformist ideas that were then considerably popular in Sumatra and Java.

Joining the movement in 1924, Ahmad Hassan introduced ideological structure and individuality to Persatuan Islam. Hassan emphasized that man's relationship with God depended on the correct interpretation and implementation of Islamic religious law. In 1926¹⁷⁷, Persatuan Islam formally adopted a fundamentalist ideology, basing the propagation and instruction of Islam on the Qur'an and Sunna. Fundamentalist thought in Indonesia, as expressed by Ahmad Hassan and later Isa Anshary¹⁷⁸, also stressed the establishment of an Islamic state (negara Islam). Fundamentalist zeal in seeking the establishment of negara Islam and Persatuan Islam's intemperate style was viewed as a radical departure from governmental views and intolerant toward Pancasila as a national ideology.

Darul Islam (DI), the first group of Muslim fanatics to emerge in Indonesia, drew its political and military strength from Islamic values and outlook. During the first few years after the proclamation of independence, the ABRI and (Masjumi)

Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, 13.

¹⁷⁷At this time secessionist group emerged who advocated the madhhabs (ummah) as chief guide for religious life, forming a rival organization known as the Permoefakatan Islam. Ibid, 14.

¹⁷⁸When the Persatuan Islam was formally reconstituted in April 1948, Mohammad Isa Anshary became general chairman and continued in that position until 1961. During his tenure as chairman, Anshary provided leadership and a point of view just as Ahmad Hassan had done in the pre-war years. Ibid, 124-5.

paramilitary units warred against Dutch forces. In an attempt to bring about peace, the 1948 Renville Treaty restricted the territories of the Republic of Indonesia in Java, granting the Dutch a state called Pasundan and military forces in West Java. Darul Islam was born shortly after the conclusion of the Renville agreement, consisting of guerilla units which refused to be withdrawn from West Java.¹⁷⁹

Initially, the Darul Islam represented a radical, nationalist movement that fought against the Dutch. However, in late 1948, the Indonesian Republic became its principal target. In 1949, Darul Islam leader Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo proclaimed Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) , or an Islamic state, in Cisayong. Such a proclamation not only posed a threat to Pancasila but was vehemently opposed by the government. The Darul Islam became a central concern to both the Indonesian government and military.

Between 1950 and 1957, Darul Islam activities occurred throughout West Java. DI troops operated from the mountains, with occasional incursions from the Banten region and across the eastern border with Central Java. They controlled vast areas in southeastern Priangan and were especially influential in the "de facto NII territories" of Garut, Tasikmalaya and Ciamis.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹Compliance with the Renville agreement required the ABRI to withdraw its forces from West Java.

¹⁸⁰For more detail on Darul Islam strongholds within villages see C. Van Djik, Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam (Netherlands: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, 1981), pp. 102-4.

Darul Islam activities generally peaked in August with the 7th and 17th as two important historical dates. August 7th commemorated the birthday of the Islamic State of Indonesia while the 17th marked Independence Day for the Republic. Sometimes Muslim holidays would also inspire intensified campaigns.¹⁸¹

In general, the local population experienced village raids, looting, robberies, attacks and kidnappings. Until 1961, more than 1,500 people were killed annually.¹⁸² The villagers supporting the Darul Islam and those supporting the Army behaved differently. In the Army-controlled villages, people were afraid to stay in their homes at night, sleeping in the fields or in the mountains. On the other hand, Darul Islam-affiliated villagers left their homes during the day when Army patrols conducted raids.

The Army had some successes but was in stalemate with Darul Islam until the mid-1950s. The regions under government control experienced hit-and-run tactics employed by DI militants. The guerillas occupied villages for a few hours, attacked isolated military posts, and retreated into the forests and mountains before the Army was able to react.¹⁸³ The rural areas remained unsafe and military units travelling through them were subject to DI ambushes. In West Java itself, the civil war was fought

¹⁸¹Djik cites Lebaran, the end of Ramadan fasting, as another date that provoked increased Darul Islam activity. Ibid, 121.

¹⁸²Ibid, 105.

¹⁸³Ibid, 121.

largely in rural areas.

By 1957, successive military operations pushed back and isolated Darul Islam militants to the Garut area. The Army used techniques such as forming a civilian advancing line, known as "the human fence" or "human shield," and forced the rebels to surrender by cutting off food (rice) supplies. Despite the overall effectiveness of the Army, the Darul Islam continued to pose a serious security threat as evidenced in the near successful¹⁸⁴ kidnapping of Khrushchev in February 1960 and May 1962 assassination attempt on then-President Sukarno. An intensive military, anti-Darul Islam campaign in West Java led to the capture of Kartosuwirjo and his wife two years later. The majority of the Darul Islam members surrendered and swore allegiance to the Indonesian Republic at that time. In September 1962, Kartosuwirjo was executed, along with four other DI members involved in the Sukarno assassination plot.

Darul Islam was not confined to Java. It branched out to other islands in the 1950s. Kahar Muzakkar led operations in southern Sulawesi while Daub Beureueh operated in Aceh.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴The militants dressed in Army uniforms and attempted to kidnap the Soviet ruler on his way from Bogor to Bandung. The Darul Islam frequently conducted raids or ambushes along that road traveled from Jakarta (via Bogor) to Bandung. Ibid, pp. 125, 103.

¹⁸⁵Anwar, "Islam and Politics," 121. In addition to the Darul Islam-affiliated movements in South Sulawesi and Aceh, a relatively minor uprising occurred in South Kalimantan from 1950 to 1963. Discussion regarding Kalimantan is excluded because the rebels never controlled a large area nor a great number of troops in comparison to the Darul Islam in Sulawesi and Aceh. For detailed discussion see Djik, Rebellion, chap. 5.

However, the contacts between the Darul Islam factions in South Sulawesi and West Java were not very close. Muzakkar initially refrained from using the movement's name for his troops which were called Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat (People's Liberation Army). Only four years after Kartusuwirjo's proclamation of NII did Muzakkar announce his movement in Sulawesi and the rest of East Indonesia as merging with the Islamic State.¹⁸⁶

Muzakkar's guerillas adhered to the principles of "moment operasi" and avoided battle when circumstances were in favor of the ABRI. As a rule, the Army's only successful operations were those carried out along the coast in coordination with the other services. In 1953 and 1954 joint operations (involving Army, Navy and Air Force units) focused on large-scale attacks against Darul Islam units in the swamps to the north and east of Ujungpandang.¹⁸⁷ The situation improved for the ABRI after 1955, when its operations became more successful. Muzakkar began negotiations in mid-1960 as he gradually lost ground. The South Sulawesi Darul Islam rebellion ended when Muzakkar died in an Army ambush in February 1965.¹⁸⁸

Darul Islam-affiliated rebellion in Aceh erupted in September 1953 when followers of Islamic leader Daud Beureu'eh

¹⁸⁶In August 1953, Muzakkar in fact proclaimed Sulawesi part of the Islamic Republican State of Indonesia (Negara Republik Islam Indonesia), reflecting the low frequency of contacts with Darul Islam in Java. Ibid, 189.

¹⁸⁷Ibid, 207.

¹⁸⁸Ibid, 217.

attacked and seized control of towns and rural areas in northern Sumatra. As early as 1939, an Islamic Scholars' Association, the Persatuan Ulama-ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA), was founded and carried much influence in Aceh. Aceh Besar was the center of Muhammadiyah activity during the era of Islamic revivalism in Sumatra. The climax of reformist enthusiasm in Aceh since the 1920s resulted in PUSA.¹⁸⁹ The Islamic association later developed into a nationalist organization, opposing colonization and aiding the Japanese in fighting the Dutch.¹⁹⁰ Acehnese Islamic scholars remained a strong force during and after Japanese occupation. Upon Indonesia's independence, Darul Islam extended its ties to Beureu'eh, founder and former leader of PUSA.¹⁹¹

The relationship between the central organization in Aceh and the NII in West Java was strained. Tension, rather than cooperation, dominated the relationship between the two

¹⁸⁹Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 25.

¹⁹⁰PUSA's adoption of an anti-Dutch policy coincided with the extension of Japan's hegemony in Southeast Asia. PUSA found an ally in Japan and planned an anti-Dutch rebellion on the eve of the Japanese landings in Indonesia. Aceh was the only area in Indonesia where Japanese invasion drew active armed support from the local population. See Djik, Rebellion, 270-3.

¹⁹¹It is unclear whether Beureu'eh initiated contact with Kartosuwirjo to join the ranks of Darul Islam. However, the integration of Aceh into the Islamic State of Indonesia was coordinated through envoys between Beureu'eh and Kartosuwirjo. Ibid, 300.

movements.¹⁹² The Acehese leaders disagreed with the Darul Islam's implementation of a military system in West Java. They believed that even though Negara Islam Indonesia was in constant war it should apply the sound principles and functions of a state.¹⁹³

Contrary to the other DI-inspired revolts, the Aceh rebellion ended peacefully through negotiations instead of military defeat. The central government gave in to the Acehese demand for special provincial status (autonomy) in the fields of religion, adat and education.¹⁹⁴ As a result, Beureu'eh ceased his resistance in May 1962. Aceh remained relatively quiet until 1977,¹⁹⁵ when Darul Islam activities coincided with Islamic resurgence in Java and other parts of Sumatra.

Since the Darul Islam movement, Indonesia has experienced a series of violent acts carried out by generally isolated Muslim organizations. The most well known was Komando Jihad, led by Faried Ghozali. It functioned as an underground network using diverse terrorist tactics in the rural areas of Java and Medan

¹⁹²Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehese Rebellion (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 230.

¹⁹³Ibid, 233.

¹⁹⁴Ibid, 269.

¹⁹⁵Hasan Mohammad Tiro once again proclaimed Aceh an independent state as leader of the Free Aceh Movement, which did not gain much momentum. Ibid, 339.

area of Sumatra.¹⁹⁶ Komando Jihad bombings of churches and theaters plagued the late 1970s. In June 1977, government authorities arrested 700 alleged members of Komando Jihad.¹⁹⁷ Many of the detainees were former Darul Islam supporters. Several years later during their trials, some of the arrested men argued in vain that they were intelligence agents (hired by the Army) and denied the existence of a Komando Jihad.¹⁹⁸ At least a hundred individuals with ties to Komando Jihad remain scattered throughout Indonesia today, indicating radical fundamentalists have not garnered enough popular support for an underground movement since Komando Jihad.¹⁹⁹

Despite periodic mass arrests, there have been numerous violent incidents throughout Indonesia carried out by radical fundamentalists. In 1981, Garuda Airlines was hijacked by the Muslim extremist Imran group. In October 1984, banks, shopping centers and factories were bombed. A month later fires were set to businesses in Jakarta. The Borobudur Hindu temple was partially destroyed from a terrorist bomb in 1985.

¹⁹⁶Nasir Tamara, Indonesia in the Wake of Islam (Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1986), p. 19.

¹⁹⁷TAPOL, Muslims On Trial, 15.

¹⁹⁸One theory hypothesizes that Komando Jihad was a government-initiated concept created to publically link Muslim activism to alleged terrorist activities, intimidating the Ummat Islam as a whole. Ibid, 15.

¹⁹⁹Sunardi indicated that about 100 radical fundamentalists of the Komando Jihad flavor are scattered throughout Indonesia. However, he was quick to point out that these individuals do not appear to belong to a large-scale, organized movement. Sunardi interview, Jakarta, January 19, 1995.

The most disturbing event to authorities was the Tanjung Priok riots in 1984. Muslims began demonstrations after several soldiers defiled a mosque by entering without removing their shoes.²⁰⁰ The motive behind the Muslim anger was economic deprivation and political impotence under the Pancasila ideology which erupted into rioting after provocation by government troops.²⁰¹ Soldiers resolved the unrest by shooting the Muslim protestors.

²⁰⁰Adam Schwarz, A Nation In Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994) p. 173. See also Susumu Awanohara, "A First Warning Shot," FEER (September 27, 1984): 14-6.

²⁰¹Schwarz, Nation In Waiting, 173.

IV. CURRENT ROLE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

"Is Islam-phobia possible in a country
where most of the people are Muslims?"
- Nasir Tamara²⁰²

Army General Soeharto took over the presidency following Sukarno's questionable involvement in a 1965 Communist coup attempt. In the wake of the coup attempt, the government returned to a limited democracy called the New Order with the military as the major political actor. Muslim groups expected to be rewarded for helping the military eradicate the Communists and toppling Sukarno. Anti-Communist Islamic groups actively participated in the military's campaign to purge all Communist influence and massacre PKI members. Instead, Soeharto consolidated his power by integrating the ABRI under a single operational command and structuring political parties under a government (military-sponsored) party known as Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya (GOLKAR).²⁰³

The achievement of political stability has been the keynote of Soeharto's domestic policy since he assumed power.²⁰⁴ His obsession for stability fostered paranoia over political Islam.

²⁰²Taken from (quoted in) Schwarz, Nation In Waiting, 162.

²⁰³Harold Crouch, "The Trend to Authoritarianism," in Harry Aveling, ed., Development of Indonesian Society: The Coming of Islam to the Present Day (New York: St Martin's Press, 1980), p. 195.

²⁰⁴K.E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 61.

With the PKI eliminated, only Islam had the mass support and organizational foundation to challenge the government. The military government did not want any rival political power that could threaten national security. The trauma of Darul Islam was far from forgotten with its radical fundamentalists destabilizing the government and creating disunity among the people. Consequently, President Soeharto's attitude toward Islam has been one of cautious tolerance. As long as Islam is not mixed with politics, it will be tolerated.²⁰⁵ Soeharto's view that Islam should be separated from political ideology dominates in Indonesia today.

A. GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF ISLAM

Since the Soeharto government perceived political Islam as a threat to Pancasila-based Indonesia, various laws were enacted to combat the growing strength of political Islam. In 1973, Soeharto banned all parties based on religion. The four Islamic parties which held seats in the national parliament were united, by law, under the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). The same year, a draft marriage law spurred the New Order's first serious clash with Islamic fundamentalism.²⁰⁶ Muslim youth gathered to protest the law outside the parliament building. Eventually, the government changed the law to appear less secular in nature,

²⁰⁵Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, 129.

²⁰⁶While the draft bill allowed marriage for each religion to be regulated by separate laws (in accordance to religious beliefs), it required a Muslim man to appear before civil court for divorce before marriage between two people of different religions could be legalized. Tamara, Wake of Islam, 16.

appeasing Muslim sentiment.²⁰⁷

A year later, Muslim student demonstrations turned into rioting bearing a distinctive anti-Christian tone. In January 1974 during Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka's visit, Muslims rioted targeting Chinese businesses and properties. Since the 1950s, Muslim resentment of the ethnic Chinese has plagued Indonesia because of their shrewd business sense and economic clout. Further, the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia is associated with Christian affluence even though many Chinese practice Buddhism and Confucianism.

These incidents underlined Soeharto's increased concern over the development of Islam and the need for a national ideology, prompting the government to emphasize the doctrine of Pancasila. As a result, the government directed schools to include "Pancasila Morality" into curriculums. The MPR and a committee known as "Team P4" undertook further measures in 1978 to promote Pancasila through Indonesian society.²⁰⁸ This was a large-scale, national program in which members of the elite from every section of society participated to include bureaucrats, political leaders, businessmen, students and religious leaders.²⁰⁹ Finally, the government's 1984 decision to require political, religious and social organizations to adopt Pancasila as their

²⁰⁷Schwarz, Nation In Waiting, 172.

²⁰⁸In light of the political situation in Iran, the government intensified efforts to promote Pancasila, hoping to counterbalance Islamic ideology. Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, 91.

²⁰⁹Tamara, Wake of Islam, 17.

sole ideological basis directly conflicted with Islam. For many Muslims, the Qur'an provides the sole ideological basis. Implementation of the single ideological principle, or "asas tunggal," remains a source of tension between the government and Islamic fundamentalists today.²¹⁰

To maintain control over Islamic activity, the Indonesian government created a bureaucratic ministry. All religious matters in Indonesia are officially handled through the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Despite the fact that over 90 percent of the Indonesians consider themselves Muslim, the constitution does not identify Islam as the national religion. Therefore, the ministry administers all five religions recognized in the constitution: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and

Buddhism.²¹¹ It does this by pursuing 12 formal goals:

- (1) To realize to the greatest extent possible the principle of the Oneness of God;
- (2) To ensure that every inhabitant enjoys the freedom to choose his own religion and to perform services according to his own religion and convictions;
- (3) To guide, support, maintain, and develop sound religious currents;
- (4) To provide, guide, and supervise religious education in state schools;
- (5) To guide, support, and supervise education and training at madrasah (modernized religious schools) and other religious schools;
- (6) To organize training for religious teachers and religious judges;

²¹⁰Liddle, Politics And Culture, 30.

²¹¹Deliar Noer, Administration of Islam in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1978), p. 8.

- (7) To take care of everything related to the spiritual teaching of members of the armed forces, and those in hostels, prisons, and other necessary places;
- (8) To arrange, perform, and supervise all questions related to marriage, divorce, and reconciliation of Muslims;
- (9) To give material support for the repair and maintenance of places of worship (mosques, churches, etc.);
- (10) To organize and supervise religious courts and the Supreme Islamic Court;
- (11) To carry out investigation into matters related to waqf (property donated for religious/community use), to register waqf institutions and supervise their management; and
- (12) To promote people's intelligence and skills in social and religious life.²¹²

The Ministry of Religious Affairs is unique to Indonesia. Its two main functions are: to encourage duty to religion and inter-religious harmony. The ministry was started solely for Islamic affairs shortly after independence to protect the governmental interests of religious harmony and an integrated nation. It provided a venue for the government to influence popular Muslim religious leaders and, in turn, the people. Since 1970, it has also enjoyed a monopoly in administering the hajj. A specific directorate within the Ministry of Religion exists to manage the Islamic pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. It requires four to six months of preliminary work covering immigration, passport, bank, accommodation and airline travel issues.²¹³

²¹²Cited in Noer, taken from Peraturan Pemerintah (Indonesian Government Regulation) No. 33/1949 and No. 8/1950; Peraturan Menteri Agama (Regulations of the Minister of Religion) No. 5/1951, in Kementerian Agama dan Parleman (Jakarta: Kementerian Agama, 1951), pp. 91-93.

²¹³Taher interview, Jakarta, January 19, 1995.

Development of the Ministry's organizational structure began in 1946. Originally consisting of eight divisions, by 1972 the structure increased to a bureaucracy of six directorates administering Islam, Hajj, Secretary General, Protestant, Catholic, and Hindu-Buddhist. The existence of the Ministry of Religious Affairs provides an institutional form of the compromise between an Islamic and secular state. The seemingly tolerant current of Indonesian society allows religious pluralism to exist as formally induced by the Ministry.²¹⁴

The ABRI and Islam have harbored a deep animosity since the early years of independence. Suspicion and distrust exist between the two, partly due to history. Muslim armed units clashed with the Army during the hectic period between 1945 and 1949.²¹⁵ Later, the military became increasingly concerned with Islamic muscle-flexing when in 1974 Muslim groups organized unprecedented demonstrations in Jakarta against the government's draft legislation regarding Muslim marriages. The same groups went on to play a leading role in student protest movements of 1978. Cultural factors also promote the military's distrust of Islam. The ABRI is predominately Javanese in origin, composition

²¹⁴Indonesian tolerance for religious pluralism may be due to Soeharto's careful selection of individuals to head the ministry. For example, the first Minister of Religion was Haji Mohammad Rasjidi. Well-known and respected by Muslims, he was not only an important figure in Muhammadiyah but a 1938 graduate of the reputable Al-Azhar University in Cairo.

²¹⁵As discussed earlier, the Darul Islam movement brought about many uprisings. For additional discussion on clashes, see TAPOL, Muslims On Trial, 2-3.

and orientation. Java and the Javanese, the people who originate from Central and East Java, have always occupied a position of dominance in Indonesia since the early beginnings of the nationalist movement. As a result, resentment fostered among the ethnic groups living in the outer islands where Muslim orthodoxy is stronger than in Javanese heartland where Islam is far less universally orthodox.²¹⁶

Many military officers who cherish the Javanese cultural tradition remain suspicious of Islam as a rival culture. They believe political Islam flourishes at the expense of Javanese culture. Few officers have a santri background. Of those who do, or are close to Islamic organizations, few have been given positions of strategic national command or large influence. The ABRI leadership believes devout Muslims discourage Indonesian nationalism by mixing religion with politics. As a result, pro-Islamic sentiment within the ABRI remains unarticulated. The majority of its officers may affirm Islam as their religion but are opposed to intense devoutness.

In general, the ABRI views Islamic fundamentalism as an obstacle to its current political supremacy. As a universal religion, Islam offers a powerful alternative to historic Javanese rule. In the past, the military regarded the Masjumi-oriented Muslims as extremists because of Masjumi's widespread support among the santri masses. Accusations of Muslim extremism in Indonesia were largely based upon the potential threat Islam

²¹⁶Ibid, 1.

posed to the political domination of a Javanese-oriented military.²¹⁷

Today confrontation between Islam and the Army still exists. The military fears a resurgence of Muslim extremism to the likes of the Darul Islam movement. Particularly after Islamic resurgence in the Middle East, the Muslim faith, or military-perceived Islamic threat, was taken more seriously in Indonesia. The 1984 Tanjung Priok riots confirm the military's fear of Muslim discontent and unrest. The excessive military force used in responding to Tanjung indicates a deep-seated official fear of Muslim extremists and any expression of Islamic fundamentalism continues in Indonesia.

Although Islamic revivalism, resurgence and radicalism emerged during varied time periods, elements of each phenomenon remain imbedded in society. Indonesia has not completely suppressed political Islam or extinguished Islamic fundamentalism, much less its occasional radical expressions.²¹⁸ For this reason, the government has shown itself willing to compromise on a number of issues from the marriage bill controversy of 1973 to the refusal of Indonesian Catholic requests for a visit by the Pope.

President Soeharto recognizes his New Order government fostered much Muslim resentment by effectively limiting Islam's

²¹⁷Ibid, 563.

²¹⁸Nash contends that "any state where the scriptural religions have a hold on a sizable population can never fully expunge fundamentalist tendencies," 730.

political power. While the ABRI continued to carry out military and intelligence operations against Muslim groups in the early 1980s, Soeharto adopted a more positive attitude towards Islam. The government became more tolerant of Islamic religious practices, emphasizing Muslim obligations to traditional Islam. To be explicitly Islamic became socially respectable.²¹⁹ Additionally, following the Tanjung incident, high-ranking military officers, including former ABRI Commander General Try Sutrisno, visited Muslim communities throughout Java. They went as far as wearing sarong and kopiat (the traditional Indonesian cap associated with Islam) as they prayed with the people in the mosques.²²⁰

Today the government funds the building of mosques by the tens of thousands, sponsors an official biennial national Qur'an reading competition, gives assistance to Muslim schools, and consults regularly with Muslims in the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Teachers' Assembly) and council of Islamic leaders.²²¹ Soeharto is well aware of the fact that Indonesian students and youth hold the forefront of Islamic movements today. If these young people win middle-class backing or mass organized

²¹⁹For example, government officials are expected to lead the prayers during Ramadan, and first class hotels in Jakarta have made designated areas available for Muslims to pray in. Both Actions unthinkable in the past. Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, 129.

²²⁰An action meant to reassure the Muslim community that the government was not anti-Islamic in its policies. Tamara, Wake Of Islam, 19.

²²¹Liddle, Politics And Culture, 30-1.

support, a major political upheaval could result.²²² But for the moment, it appears that the government is not seriously threatened.

B. FUNDAMENTALISM ON THE HORIZON

The extent to which Indonesia is a Muslim country is difficult to measure. Rigid adherence to Shari'a is not found nor officially encouraged. Throughout Indonesia, traditional law based on adat takes precedence over strict Islamic customs.²²³ Muslim courts exist specifically for the determination of marital and inheritance disputes which do not concern the United States. Domestic policies prohibit religious politics, forcing tolerance and social harmony among all religions. However, the lack of outward Islamic appearances is misleading. Events in Indonesia the last 20 years show a trend of rising Islamic fundamentalism.

Underneath the appearance of calm inactivity, Islamic fundamentalism thrives in Indonesia, influencing all levels of society. The government advocates Islam as a social force, suppressing political Islam. No viable Islamic political parties exist nor are they allowed to form today in Indonesia. Unable to promote fundamentalist or political religious dogma, Muslim intellectuals package their ideas under social and educational welfare activities. The absence of a strong Muslim political party could prove dangerous to future political stability. There

²²²Nash, "Islamic Resurgence," 729.

²²³Cecilia Albin, "The Politics of Terrorism: A Contemporary Survey," in Barry Rubin, The Politics of Terrorism (Washington D.C.: John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1989), p. 183.

exists no political mechanism for Muslims to express their views or exercise activism. Radical fundamentalism emerges in its worst form in the absence of institutional means of expressing dissent. The case of Algeria reflects the danger of limiting pluralism and excluding fundamentalist groups from the political process altogether.

The tradition of Muslim extremism exists in Indonesia. While it is difficult to gage their collective force, the ability of radical fundamentalists to destabilize the country is readily apparent. Several bombs exploded in Jakarta's Chinatown in October through November 1984, targeting Chinese-affiliated businesses and banks.²²⁴ Sporadic violent outbreaks continued well into the late 1980s, threatening internal stability. Further, contemporary military officers are not convinced that Islamic radicalism has been extinguished. The Army's heavy handed treatment of Muslim protestors during the 1984 Tanjung Priok affair was followed by the 1989 Lampung incident in southern Sumatra. The Army blamed both incidents on Muslim extremism, highlighting the ABRI's phobia of Islam.²²⁵

Unlike Darul Islam, the chain of violent events Indonesia

²²⁴See Susumu Awanohara, "Bombs in Chinatown," FEER (October 18, 1984): 18-9, and Manggi Habir, "The Chicken Noodle Bomb," FEER (October 25, 1984): 27.

²²⁵Later investigations reveal that social discontent in Lampung was due to land tenure problems not religious fanaticism. Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 128. See also Vatikiotis, "The Social Factor," FEER (March 9, 1989): 25.

experienced prior to and following Tanjung Priok seem isolated and short-lived. Increased government-funded religious education solved the problem of people turning to charismatic Islamic leaders for political leadership. Currently, all licensed imams pass through a government Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) before being allowed to preach.²²⁶ Islamic leaders mistrusted by the government are banned from mosques. Since the Tanjung riot, tight restrictions are imposed on the activities of Muslim preachers. Not only is criticism of Pancasila considered subversive, but advocacy of strict implementation of Shari'a is considered a threat to national interests. Leaders of the jemaah usroh,²²⁷ a network of Islamic studies groups which urged strict implementation of Islamic law, were arrested or imprisoned on suspicion of subversive activities.²²⁸

The government also closely monitors Islamic studies to maintain religious tolerance. Muslim students who return from Middle Eastern countries tend to advocate a more radicalized view of Islamic fundamentalism.²²⁹ As a result, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has encouraged more academic exchanges (for Islamic studies) in western countries rather than the traditional

²²⁶Vatikiotis, Politics Under Suharto, 127.

²²⁷Usroh, the Arabic word for family, is associated with militant Muslim activities in Indonesia. Many of the arrested Usroh activists were active Muhammadiyah members.

²²⁸Vatikiotis, Politics Under Suharto, 125.

²²⁹Prof. Dr. H. Mohammad Koesnoe, Director of Middle Eastern Studies Center, Islamic Studies Institute, Surabaya interview, January 28, 1995.

centers in the Middle East the past 10 years. Its intentions are to allow a mixture of ideas to align the Ummat Islam with "moderate" Islamic views.²³⁰ Soeharto's secular-oriented policies draw support from Muslim intellectuals with a western education and close ties to the Javanese culture.²³¹

Inter-religious relations in Indonesia are usually considered excellent.²³² So much so, that former Minister of Religious Affairs Munawir Sjadzali claims that Indonesia provides a model to the rest of the Muslim world.²³³ The more recent Islamic radicalism appears to have been rooted in disaffection with the government rather than intolerance. Muslim protest has originated from the pulpits of mosques, Islamic meetings or rallies and religious study groups. Many failed politicians have escaped into the sanctuary of the mosques due to the New Order's lack of political pluralism. Similarly, young people interested in politics are active in their community mosques.

There is a constant undercurrent of Muslim activism looking for avenues of expression.²³⁴ University Islamic study groups

²³⁰Islamic studies abroad were primarily conducted in the Middle East and with the Arabs. Minister of Religious Affairs Taher claimed that today Arabs now have "marginal influence." The ministry's present efforts encourage scholars to pursue studies in Pakistan, Canada, the U.S. and Europe. Jakarta interview, January 19, 1995.

²³¹Ibid, 127.

²³²Vatikiotis, Politics Under Suharto, 126.

²³³Jakarta interview, January 18, 1995.

²³⁴See Michael Vatikiotis, "Islam's Hidden Warriors," FEER (February 23, 1989): 10-11.

and mosques have become hotbeds of radical fundamentalism.²³⁵ In the 1980s, the preaching of Immaddudin, a fiery Muslim intellectual with distinct leanings toward Iranian Islamic theology, inspired students at Salman Mosque.²³⁶ As a result a spirit of militancy cultivated among university students. Essentially, intelligent Indonesian youth who feel that their talents are being wasted have become more politically involved and adopted radical views since 1985.

Thus far, Soeharto has demonstrated skill in pacifying Islamic fundamentalism. His efforts to garner support under the banner of Islam have been successful beginning with the 1990 creation of an Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals' Association, known as Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (ICMI).²³⁷ This unification of Muslim intellectuals under a single organization has historic precedent. ICMI is headed by Minister for Research and Technology B.J. Habibie, a personal friend and advisor of Soeharto.²³⁸ Although ICMI claims no political agenda,

²³⁵See Awanohara, "A First Warning Shot," and "The New Call to Prayer," FEER (January 24, 1985): 26-30.

²³⁶Salman Mosque is attached to the prestigious Bandung Institute of Technology.

²³⁷For many Muslims, the president's act was merely the latest in a series of overtures the government has made over the past few years to the umma. To others, the creation of ICMI seemed to represent a dangerous departure from secularism. Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class," in Audrey Kahia, ed., Indonesia, no. 56 (October 1993): 1.

²³⁸Habibie's close personal relationship with Soeharto began as a boy while he lived near the Makassar military headquarters in the beginning of the 1950s. Crouch, Army And Politics, 123. See also

Habibie's influence and the launching of a Muslim newspaper and think tank make this hard to believe.²³⁹ Several prominent leaders and intellectuals in Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama do not support ICMI due to the implied political manifestations and controversy surrounding political Islam.

Soeharto seems to be playing the Muslim card to counter stirrings of an increasingly disillusioned military.²⁴⁰ The ABRI represents the largest political organization and root of national stability. It is intensely devoted to the dwi fungsi doctrine.²⁴¹ Additionally, it has played an integral historic role, holding the key to political stability since the 1965 Communist coup attempt. Military influence also extends into Indonesia's economy. Many state enterprises are run by military-dominated boards. Soeharto also allows the manipulation of export credits and awards numerous state contracts to ABRI.²⁴²

Political issues in 1993 revolved around Soeharto's relationship with the ABRI and presidential succession. While Soeharto seemed to be promoting a process of civilianization, it

Colonel Colin East, "Who Is Dr. Habibie?" Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (October-November 1994): 7-9.

²³⁹ICMI's Center for Information and Development counters the Christian-led think tank known as the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

²⁴⁰See Vatikiotis, Politics Under Suharto, 132.

²⁴¹The ABRI is the only military in Southeast Asia with a legal and ideological basis (dwi fungsi) for its role in civilian affairs.

²⁴²Vatikiotis, Politics Under Suharto, 71.

appeared that military officers began positioning themselves to play a dominant role in the post-Soeharto era. In March 1993, Soeharto was reelected unanimously for a sixth presidential term. Concern regarding a successor arose among the elite political circles. ABRI leaders were particularly worried about the a succession crisis if Soeharto suddenly fell ill or died without a broadly acceptable candidate in place as vice president.²⁴³ Although most military officers respect Soeharto for maintaining political stability since 1965, the prospect of the presidency passing to someone not closely identified with the ABRI concerned them.²⁴⁴

C. LOOKING AHEAD

Indonesia has not experienced presidential succession in a normal political climate. It also lacks established and viable socio-political institutions, other than the military, to ensure that the nation's fate is not dependent upon a single individual. According to Javanese tradition, the president becomes the absolute ruler, succeeded by a self-appointed individual. He is viewed as God's vicegerent to conduct both worldly and celestial affairs of the people.²⁴⁵ Soeharto's successor is expected to possess the personal qualities of being a military man, a Muslim,

²⁴³In 1988, the military planned to summon a special session of the MPR to elect its own candidate as Soeharto's successor if crisis occurred. The military leadership disliked acting Vice President Sudharmono. Ibid, 123.

²⁴⁴See Crouch, Army and Politics, 122-3.

²⁴⁵Syamsuddin, The Republican Revolt, 17-8.

and a Javanese. Many Indonesians feel that these are the prerequisites a leader must possess to successfully lead their diverse nation.²⁴⁶

Indonesia's political history under Soeharto's tight rein raises doubt over the smooth transfer of power. The new government must be able to cope with complex economic and developmental problems along with the basic need to secure human rights for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Muslims will likely question governmental legitimacy once a successor is named. The current political climate harbors resentment toward the government in light of the lack of plurality and ABRI tendency to overreact to public expressions of dissension. Islamic fundamentalism has succeeded in providing Indonesians a sense of purpose and spiritual belonging. It acts as a powerful creed on university campuses, especially at the Bandung Institute of Technology and the Bogor Agricultural Institute in West Java.²⁴⁷ Campus mosques at both institutions are well-known centers of Islamic study where a new breed of religiously devout leaders are emerging. While not yet in direct opposition (with the government), their political attitudes are antagonistic toward a government viewed as hostile to Islamic fundamentalism.²⁴⁸

Islam in Indonesia primarily affects domestic policy by acting as an integrative force. In the cases of the Wahhabi

²⁴⁶Ibid, 18.

²⁴⁷Liddle, Politics and Culture, 13.

²⁴⁸Ibid, 13.

movement and Khomeini's revolution, Islam instilled a sense of mission among the fundamentalists.²⁴⁹ Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia emerges in several forms. It is usually characterized by political passivity except when led by radical elements or an external hostile source. As a whole, the fundamentalism found within represents a heightening of Islamic consciousness among the masses, emphasizing identity and ideology. It represents the desire to return to the religious principles on which Islam was founded.

The potency of Islamic fundamentalism within a country reflects the depth of the government's ineffectiveness to reform. A causal relationship exists between social crisis and Islamic fundamentalism.²⁵⁰ Lack of socioeconomic justice, official corruption, and governmental repression against activists are crisis conditions that contribute to the fundamentalist cause. Political stability becomes an issue only when extremists or radical fundamentalists emerge from within the group of devout Muslims. Thus far, Indonesia's government has functioned well under Soeharto. The teachings of the Qur'an are influenced by local custom, historical circumstance, and the passive nature of Islamic leadership. Indonesian Muslim intellectuals favor democracy and abide by the principles of Pancasila. Radical fundamentalism acts on the fringes of politics. Fundamentalism

²⁴⁹Adeed Dawisha, Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Syndicate Press, 1983), p. 4.

²⁵⁰Ibid, 8.

found in middle class populated, urban areas reflect a moderate approach toward Islamic politics and society. In contrast, rural areas housing the uneducated and poor foster favorable conditions for extremist tendencies.

The evolution of Indonesian Islamic fundamentalism depends on the quality of its political and intellectual leadership and governmental legitimacy. Fundamentalism acts as a venue of protest against socioeconomic inequalities and political injustices. Given the long term propensity of crisis conditions ranging from unchecked population growth to maldistributed economic wealth, the trend of rising fundamentalism, particularly the resurgence of political Islam, will continue in Indonesia.

V. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

"Islam is not one hundred percent democracy,
neither is it one hundred percent autocracy.
Islam is...Islam."

-Mohammad Natsir²⁵¹

U.S. national security interests all over the world significantly changed after the threat of Communist expansion disintegrated with the collapse of the Soviet Union around 1990. Although a single over-arching threat to international security no longer exists, countless dangers remain: ethnic cleansing, religious extremism, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear, chemical and other military technologies, and drug trafficking. Facing an increasingly diverse and unpredictable threat environment, America aspires to aid developing nations and newly established democracies through its political and military leadership. In turn, the successful promotion of democracy and political stability abroad are mutually supportive of advancing U.S. economic prosperity. This chapter focuses on Islamic fundamentalism as it affects U.S. interests in Indonesia.

The National Strategy as published by the White House specifies U.S. major global interests as security (peace and stability), prosperity (equal opportunity for American commerce in free and open markets), and promotion of democracy and human rights (as judged in the eyes of America). This chapter gives an overview of U.S.-Indonesian relations as a framework within which

²⁵¹Quoted in John Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 285.

to analyze the American interest in the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia from these three standpoints: as a challenge to mutual security, a threat to mutual prosperity, and an obstacle to the spread of democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia. As a result, this study provides the groundwork for conclusions and recommendations for U.S. policymaking.

A. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONS

Indonesia gained its independence as a result of World War II, leaving a relatively short record of relations between the United States and the newly emerged nation. U.S. relations with Indonesia were neutral following World War II when Allied control over Indonesia was transferred to the British. During this time, the Dutch engaged in a four year struggle from 1945 to 1949 to reestablish colonial rule over Indonesia. Although the U.S. wished to appear neutral in the conflict, its provision of arms and funding to the Dutch was common knowledge among the Indonesians. Ultimately, the U.S. backed Indonesia's bid for independence and sovereignty, pressuring the Dutch to cease hostilities in 1949.

At the outset in 1949, Indonesia manifested foreign policy unmarked by Islamic influences.²⁵² Accordingly, the religious element of Islam had no effect on U.S. relations throughout

²⁵²While Indonesia did not recognize the state of Israel, it extended support to the Palestinians on the principle of the right to national self-determination. Michael Leifer, "The Islamic Factor in Indonesia's Foreign Policy: A Case of Functional Ambiguity," Dawisha Adeed, ed., Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Syndicate Press, 1983), p. 151.

Indonesia's Guided Democracy. Rather, the pursuance of an independent and active foreign policy during the Cold War troubled the previously friendly relations between the U.S. and Indonesia. Indonesia did not want to side with Western countries nor be hostile to the few remaining Communist countries.²⁵³ The 1955 Sukarno-led Asian-African Conference in Bandung, in particular, displeased the U.S. government because it initiated the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement.

U.S.-Indonesian relations continued on a downward spiral when Indonesia launched a campaign to regain West Irian from the Dutch. In 1958, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported a rebellious movement known as the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) to counter Sukarno's expansionist policies from within. Although a compromise was reached with the Dutch by 1962 under U.S. auspices, Indonesia somewhat resented U.S. involvement in what it perceived as an internal issue. Additionally, the West Irian issue planted the seed of paranoia over CIA involvement in Indonesia's internal affairs.

In 1963, Indonesia opposed the British plan to transfer control of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo to Malaya which, together with Singapore, would form the new state of Malaysia. Indonesia withdrew from the UN to protest Malaysia's seat on the Security Council. Sukarno's blatant ideological

²⁵³O. Sutomo Roesnadi, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," Yong Mun Cheong, ed., Trends In Indonesia (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1972), p. 65.

leanings toward socialism and a pro-China stance increased tension with the United States. In 1964, Sukarno identified a leftist third force in the international community called the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) that aligned Indonesia with China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cambodia.²⁵⁴ He also launched a military campaign targeting Malaysia. "Confrontation" with Malaysia tested the last of any U.S. patience toward Sukarno. Backing Malaysia, the U.S. ceased all military aid while the Soviets and Chinese provided arms to Indonesia.

The 1965 coup attempt against Sukarno represented a landmark event in Indonesia's political history and bilateral relations with the United States. Indonesia experienced a sudden surge of anti-Communist sentiment and growing hostility toward China leading to the convergence of interests with the United States. The defeat of Communism, known as the Gestapu affair among Indonesians, served U.S. strategic interests and created what appeared to be the beginning of a pro-Western posture in foreign relations. As a result, Indonesia's warming of relations toward the U.S. after 1965 enhanced military ties between the two countries.²⁵⁵ Indonesia began to send officers for training and specialization to the U.S. under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and also obtained hardware

²⁵⁴Josef Silverstein, "The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma and Indonesia," Asian Survey, vol. 22, no. 3 (March 1982): 284.

²⁵⁵Heavy military representation in senior diplomatic posts and within the higher echelons of the Foreign Ministry reflect that Indonesian foreign policy is ultimately sanctioned by the ABRI. Leifer, "Islamic Factor," 150.

through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedures.

However, relations between the two countries could not become intimate as long as the United States was mired in Vietnam and preoccupied with the Cold War. Indonesia was thoroughly engrossed in its own modernization program and concerned with its problems with Australia and Cambodia. It was only after the events of Tiananmen that the two nations launched a positive program for better understanding.

B. MUTUAL SECURITY

Internationally, Indonesia's stature was enhanced following Soeharto's 1992 election as the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) chairman, signifying its reemergence as a leader of developing countries.²⁵⁶ The chairmanship has enabled Indonesia to take initiatives which would normally be difficult to pursue. Of interest to the United States, Indonesia's sensitivities to its predominately Muslim population made it difficult to extend diplomatic relations to Israel. However, Soeharto recently met Israeli Prime Minister Rabin under his capacity as NAM chairman.²⁵⁷ The government considers it a great honor to lead NAM, the second largest international organization after the UN,

²⁵⁶NAM was established in September 1961 as a response of a large number of developing countries to escape the bi-polar structure of the Cold War. The founding fathers were Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Nkurumah of Nigeria, and Sukarno of Indonesia. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy After the Cold War," Southeast Asian Affairs 1994 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994), p. 155.

²⁵⁷Ibid, 159.

and takes such responsibility seriously.²⁵⁸ As such Indonesian foreign policy goals include: fostering friendly relations with all nations regardless of ideology to promote international peace; avoiding conflict with neighboring countries; achieving national economic development and political stability absent of internal or external disturbances; and strengthening ASEAN to ensure future regional stability.

The only period in which Islam served as a positive element in Indonesia's foreign policy occurred during the struggle for independence.²⁵⁹ Indonesia hoped to secure recognition and international endorsement for its republic by soliciting support from the Arab League nations. In 1947, it successfully concluded treaties of friendship with Egypt and Syria while securing recognition from Iraq and Lebanon.²⁶⁰ Since then the government has restricted involvement in Islamic issues, but international issues could not altogether be excluded. When the Camp David agreement was reached in September 1978, Indonesia sought to sustain a neutral position in response to appeals from Egypt and Jordan. Regarding Iran, it refrained from making official statements when the shah was ousted or upon the release of American hostages.²⁶¹ When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1980, Indonesia chose to stress its support for a fellow non-

²⁵⁸Anwar, "Foreign Policy After The Cold War," 156.

²⁵⁹Ibid, 150.

²⁶⁰Ibid, 150.

²⁶¹Ibid, 155.

aligned state rather than an Islamic country. Today, the government continues refusing PLO requests to open an office in Jakarta in contrast to Malaysia which accords it full diplomatic status.²⁶²

Although limited in nature, both militaries have a good record of cooperation. As such, the status of ABRI interests the United States given Indonesia's valuable geographic location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and China's near vicinity. Indonesia is modestly armed for a nation of its size. By 1993, it was the twenty-third largest military establishment and ranked 120th in military personnel per 1,000 people.²⁶³ However, a low level of combat readiness is maintained. Only a few naval ships, light tanks and APCs remain operational. The Air Force operates with minimal offensive capability, devoting most of its assets to counter-insurgency operations. As a general rule, Indonesian arms purchases have been tailored for specific military requirements, avoiding over-reliance on any single supplier. In the 1980s, Indonesia bought small quantities of new equipment including 12 U.S. F-16 fighters, separate orders for three and four Dutch frigates, two West German submarines, British jet trainers and air-defence systems, and anti-ship missiles from the U.S. and France.²⁶⁴

²⁶²Ibid, 156.

²⁶³Aaron Karp, "The Pattern of Military Modernization in Southeast Asia," K.S. Sandu and Sharon Siddique, eds., The ASEAN Reader (Singapore: ISEAS, 1992), p. 405.

²⁶⁴Ibid, 405.

While Indonesia's military poses little offensive threat, recent acquisitions generate U.S. interest regarding the direction of its development and ABRI security capabilities. The Navy ordered a new Type-209 submarine from Germany and expanded its surface fleet when the first shipment of acquisitions from the former East German Navy arrived in late 1992.²⁶⁵ The 39 second-hand ships consisted of 16 Corvettes, 14 tank-landing ships (LSTs), and nine minesweepers; none of which are regarded as naval threats by regional neighbors or the United States due to their coastal missions.²⁶⁶ Indonesia also recently signed a deal with British Aerospace for the purchase of 24 Hawk fighters to be used in a counter-insurgency role.²⁶⁷

Militarily, within ASEAN Indonesia works closest with Malaysia. Defense cooperation between the two countries boils down to the basic conviction of wanting a reliable partner on the other side of its frontier. Contact between political and defense establishments is frequent along with presidential and ministerial dialogue. In addition to conducting regular joint military operations, both countries have considered implementing joint arms procurements and production proposals.²⁶⁸ In 1985, Indonesia and Malaysia began developing a joint telecommunica-

²⁶⁵Harold Crouch, "An Uncertain Outlook," Southeast Asian Affairs 1994, 141.

²⁶⁶See Asiaweek. "An Instant Armada," (June 2, 1993): 34-5.

²⁶⁷Crouch, "An Uncertain Outlook," 141.

²⁶⁸James Clad, "Strength and Security in Family Cooperation," FEER (April 18, 1985): 25.

tions venture involving the use of Indonesia's Palapa B2 satellite.²⁶⁹ Palapa A2 handled ASEAN traffic, served ABRI (intelligence) needs, and was eventually taken over by Palapa B2.²⁷⁰ Reading between the lines, a joint satellite indicates the likelihood of shared satellite intelligence. Further, both countries share an instinctive fear of long-term and long-range Chinese ambitions, a sure sign that intelligence collection targeting China is exchanged between the two countries. Finally, Indonesia and Malaysia swap information, regarding drug smuggling and piracy, twice a year at meetings of the General Border Committee.²⁷¹

Both the U.S. and Indonesia are geographically situated in the Pacific region. Indonesia's threat perceptions and concerns largely affect U.S. security interests in Southeast Asia. The past 25 years, Indonesia has contributed greatly to regional economic development and political order - vital U.S. security interests. Soeharto helped establish the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.²⁷² His commitment to regional cooperation persuaded both neighboring countries and the

²⁶⁹Clad, "Ringling in the Changes," FEER (July 25, 1985): 47.

²⁷⁰Susumu Awanohara, "A Blind Eye in the Sky," FEER (February 23, 1984): 65-6.

²⁷¹Ibid, 66.

²⁷²In the interests of regional security, ASEAN was created by a single joint declaration in Bangkok signed by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. Despite initial speculation, a Europe-type security role has not been sought and political cooperation does not extend to include defense cooperation.

international community that Indonesia planned to contain its considerable potential as a military power.²⁷³ By the close of the 1980s, Indonesia began to play an active regional role. It acted as mediator for regional policies regarding Vietnam and hosted numerous rounds of negotiations involving Cambodia's warring factions. In August 1993, it hosted an informal conference on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.²⁷⁴

1. Military Doctrine And Intelligence

While Islam has yet to exercise perceptible influence on Indonesia's international outlook or dictate rhetoric in national security affairs,²⁷⁵ considerations of its religious elements must enter U.S. calculations for a comprehensive security strategy. The ABRI began viewing Islam as a potential threat to Indonesia's stability and internal security in light of its capacity for mass mobilization and violence demonstrated by Muslim participation in the purges against the PKI. In the wake of Gestapu, Islam began affecting domestic policy as inspired by the protagonists of universal Islamic fundamentalism. Soeharto faced greater requirements to contain and take account of domestic Muslim opinion and developed ABRI's role in national

²⁷³With only 450,000 in the ABRI and police combined, Indonesia will not become a military power anytime soon. Asiaweek, "From Big to Great," (October 6, 1993): 30.

²⁷⁴The informal conference was the fourth in a series with participants from ASEAN and the six claimant countries of the Spratly's: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei.

²⁷⁵Leifer, "Islamic Factor," 148.

security accordingly.

The military acts as the primary arbiter of political power and Soeharto's arm for restoring order in Indonesia. As president, Soeharto is the Commander-In-Chief of the ABRI. Administratively, the Minister of Defense and Security falls second in command; however, the operational chain-of-command grants the ABRI Commander ultimate authority over military and intelligence operations. Comprised of the three military services and national police force,²⁷⁶ the ABRI developed three doctrines which remain in use today.

The doctrine of "national resilience" integrates the ideological, political, economic, social, and military forces of Indonesia. In upholding the principles of national resilience, the military aids societal development and manages socio-political problems, remaining especially watchful of Islamic activities. Military officers believe the ABRI functions as a "mediator" of the "frictions" that exist between the government and the people.²⁷⁷ A second doctrine reiterates national resilience and, as discussed in Chapter III, is called "dwi fungsi," or dual function. This doctrine legitimizes ABRI

²⁷⁶Indonesian citizens neither fear nor respect the police because they are known to be corrupt and influenced by bribery. Military officers, particularly those in the Army, command respect and easily exercise authority over Indonesian people. In the event of social disturbances such as rioting or ethnic violence, the Army quickly disperses personnel to the scene to restore law and order.

²⁷⁷This perception was shared with me during an interview with RADM R. M. Sunardi, Chief of Staff for Social-Political Affairs, Ministry of Defense and Security, Jakarta, January 19, 1995.

involvement in both civil and military operations. Developed during the war for independence, the third doctrine requires ABRI to operate using a territorial structure parallel to the civilian administration.

Intelligence developed in accordance with military doctrinal goals and threat perceptions under both ABRI and Ministry of Defense and Security jurisdiction. Security surveillance overlapped between three organizations predominately manned by ABRI personnel.²⁷⁸ The Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB) conducted operations and collected intelligence data, focusing on internal matters. The central domestic and foreign intelligence-gathering body was the Badan Koordinas Strategis Nasional (BAKIN) while the Special Operations Service (OPSUS)²⁷⁹ compiled political intelligence.

On October 10, 1965, then General Soeharto created KOPKAMTIB as a special agency to purge Communist influence from the country. KOPKAMTIB functioned in a similar capacity to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) but enjoyed extra constitutional powers.²⁸⁰ By 1969, KOPKAMTIB's mandate covered all internal security matters and national political life. It

²⁷⁸KOPKAMTIB personnel primarily consisted of active duty military officers and selected police. Below the central (Jakarta) headquarters level, Army commanders implemented KOPKAMTIB policies.

²⁷⁹OPSUS represented a network of operatives that gathered domestic political intelligence and conducted political liaison in service of the president.

²⁸⁰Essentially, the acceptable parameters of ABRI intervention in society were undefined when KOPKAMTIB existed. Michael Vatikiotis, "Mission Completed," FEER (September 22, 1988): 18.

exercised unrestricted powers of interrogation, arrest and detention.²⁸¹ KOPKAMTIB missions further evolved into two main tasks: to defend against subversives and safeguard governmental interests.²⁸² It collected intelligence on and directed security operations against separatist groups, Muslim activists, Communists and any groups that could be influenced by subversives. The agency's domain also covered all political prisoners and detainees in Indonesia.

Three major organizations exist today: Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional (BAKORSTANAS), BAKIN, and the Badan Inteligen ABRI (BIA). KOPKAMTIB disbanded shortly after the February 1988 resignation of ABRI Commander General Benny Murdani. BAKORSTANAS replaced KOPKAMTIB in August, functioning as a coordinating body for national security. BAKORSTANAS advises the president on political stability and stimulates government institutions to function properly, leaving arrests and prosecutions to the police.²⁸³

BAKIN can best be described as similar to the CIA. It replaced Sukarno's dissolved Central Intelligence Board in 1967

²⁸¹KOPKAMTIB involved itself in nearly every aspect of Indonesian life from screening political candidates to surveillance of demonstrations.

²⁸²Anyone opposed to the 1945 Constitution, Pancasila or the government's views were considered subversives. Melinda W. Cooke, Indonesia: A Country Study, 263.

²⁸³C. Van Djik, Political Development, Stability and Democracy: Indonesia During the Last Decade (Great Britain: Hull University Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), pp. 23-4.

as a quasi-civilian agency with a communications network outside of the defense ministry and ABRI. Although nominally superior than the other two intelligence organizations, BAKIN itself is under ABRI control. BAKIN acts as the principal national body for centralizing and coordinating domestic and foreign intelligence gathered by other agencies. It concentrates on internal security and depends on friendly links with intelligence agencies abroad for the majority of its outside knowledge.²⁸⁴ More specifically, Indonesia depends heavily on ASEAN partners, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Australia and the U.S. for foreign intelligence.²⁸⁵

BIA, formerly called the Badan Inteligen Strategis (BAIS), evolved from Army intelligence. BAIS was created by Murdani early in his tenure as ABRI Commander with the intention of remaining outside of BAKIN's domain.²⁸⁶ BAIS primarily implemented departmental intelligence functions for the military, conducting activities and collecting information relating to external defense and internal security. Today BIA acts in

²⁸⁴BAKIN has relatively few resources to conduct direct intelligence gathering. For internal issues, it relies on BAKORSTANAS and other government departments with intelligence collection capabilities such as the police, immigration, customs, Foreign Ministry and the Attorney General's Office. See Tai Ming Cheung, "Elusive Threat," FEER (April 22, 1993): 26.

²⁸⁵Indonesia maintains close intelligence-exchange relationships with Singapore and Malaysia. Ibid, 26.

²⁸⁶Murdani's differences with the Head of BAKIN resulted in lack of cooperation between agencies. Robert Karniol, "Shake-up for Indonesian Intelligence," Jane's Defence Weekly (June 17, 1989): 1209.

similar capacity to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency but devotes its assets primarily to domestic matters. Structurally, BIA and BAKORSTANAS fall under the defense ministry while BAKIN by-passes the ministry with a direct link to the president. ABRI Chief of General Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, two largely administrative positions, head BIA and BAKORSTANAS, respectively. In practice, each agency answers to the ABRI Commander to ensure intelligence operates efficiently in response to the requirements of the military commanders.²⁸⁷

2. Threats To Stability

The majority of Indonesia's military missions focus on internal unrest rather than external aggressors. National resilience and *dwi fungsi* adhere to ideologies that strongly emphasize nationalism and unity to ensure social and political stability. Perceived internal threats come from two main sources, identified as the extreme "left," the Communists, or "right," radical Islamic fundamentalists. The ABRI believe that foreign or external threats consist of activities perpetrated from the outside, such as infiltration or subversion, which can lead to war or revolution within. International terrorism and foreign-funded insurgencies fall in this category.

The Army's resources for internal security have been strained due to ongoing insurgencies. Three small insurgent

²⁸⁷When Murdani served as ABRI Commander, he acted in a dual-hatted intelligence capacity as the Head of KOPKAMTIB and BAIS and retained his hold even after becoming Defense Minister in February 1988. In late 1988, Soeharto forced Murdani to hand over control of both intelligence organizations to ABRI Commander Sutrisno.

groups exist: Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), Aceh Merdeka, and Free Papua Organization. They operate in East Timor, northern Sumatra, and Irian Jaya, respectively. The ABRI expends considerable personnel and material resources in containing these movements with no apparent end in sight. Despite this, the intelligence community continues to be well-funded with the bulk of its resources allocated to the BIA and BAKORSTANAS.²⁸⁸

Soeharto implements extensive use of intelligence to address potential security problems and political stability. Domestic issues that contribute to instability range from violent criminal acts to what the Indonesians call "SARA" problems. SARA is an acronym for the Indonesian words: suku (ethnicity), agama (religion), ras (race) and antar-golongan (inter-group rivalries).²⁸⁹ SARA problems could escalate into severe internal security threats, resulting in armed rebellions similar to what Indonesia experienced in the past.

In the 1950s, the most serious threat to internal security was radical Darul Islam. The Army's Siliwangi Division eradicated this threat by engaging 40 percent of its troops in

²⁸⁸Cheung, "Elusive Threat," 26.

²⁸⁹Dorodjatun Kuntijoro-Jakti and T.A.M. Simatupang, "Indonesia: Defense Expenditures in the Period of the New Order, 1967-85," in Chin Kin Wah, ed., Defence Spending in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 1987), p. 112.

intelligence operations.²⁹⁰ Army personnel earned the people's allegiance then engaged them in anti-terrorist activities. Siliwangi Division appointed officers from each territorial zone to liaise with villagers and police, ultimately initiating psychological warfare against Darul Islam. Army operatives cut off Darul Islam's popular support with a campaign that convinced local Muslims it was a God-opposing movement.²⁹¹

With so many overlapping functions between its agencies, Indonesia boasts a highly effective internal intelligence network. BAKORSTANAS' first test occurred in Lampung province of Sumatra. Lampung province, like much of Sumatra, is a devout Muslim area. However, since Darul Islam was eradicated in 1962, Sumatra has been free of radical Islamic activity. On February 7, 1989, the Army launched an assault against the Muslim extremist group Kommando Mujaheddin Fisabilillah in response to the murder of an Army intelligence officer.²⁹² Occurring soon after BAKORSTANAS' formation in late 1988, the Lampung incident demonstrated the effectiveness of the ABRI and its intelligence

²⁹⁰Ulf Sundhaussen, Social Policy Aspects in Defence and Security Planning in Indonesia, 1947-1977 (Queensland: James Cook University of Queensland, 1980), p. 24.

²⁹¹Ibid, 26.

²⁹²The extremists operated out of the village of Talangsari where they built several houses and a small mosque. Lampung territorial intelligence (staff) marked the group for surveillance. The Army officer was murdered while conducting an investigation of the Mujaheddin's activities. See Vatikiotis, "The Social Factor" FEER (March 9, 1989): 25.

mechanisms to respond to insurgent activity.²⁹³

Regarding national defense, ABRI policy objectives are two-fold: to safeguard the unity and development of the nation, and maintain a security posture capable of surmounting all threats.²⁹⁴ After Dutch withdrawal in 1949, the military assessed that Indonesia could not possibly defend its territory by conventional means against future foreign aggressors. Aware of its minimal defense capabilities against external threats, the ABRI adopted a strategy based on its revolutionary experience. This strategy allows invaders to land while the military retreats to mobilize popular support.²⁹⁵ The ABRI would then initiate guerilla warfare against the foreign aggressor until the enemy withdrew due to the costly price of occupation.

First and foremost, ABRI perceives China as an external threat to stability. Overseas Chinese make up a large minority population in Indonesia, which the government believes is susceptible to the influence of the Chinese government.²⁹⁶ As a

²⁹³BAKORSTANAS not only proved its worth in dealing with local unrest but also emphasized the importance of maintaining continuous contact with the local population. See Vatikiotis, "Islam's Hidden Warriors," FEER (February 23, 1989): 10-11.

²⁹⁴Purnomo, R.H. MGen. Defence and Security Capabilities of the Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, 1975), pp. 2-3.

²⁹⁵To make full use of this strategy, the ABRI organized itself along territorial rather than functional lines. As previously mentioned in this chapter, Indonesia's civilian, military and intelligence administrations still align themselves according to a territorial structure.

²⁹⁶A large number of the ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia still claim Chinese citizenship.

result, the ABRI directs its external defense efforts against China, focusing on influence extended to Indonesians as well as upon potential client states in the region.²⁹⁷ BAKIN even created a special directorate called the Chinese Problems Coordinating Agency, using operatives trained in Taiwan²⁹⁸ to watch Chinese citizens who are regarded as "potential fifth columnists."²⁹⁹

The military's attitude toward the Chinese generally improved the past ten years. Currently, Indonesia believes that China is a threat to be dealt with in the future, explaining the military's emphasis on and resource allocation toward internal security.³⁰⁰ The assimilation of ethnic Chinese into mainstream Indonesian society is now regarded a domestic problem separate from problems surrounding Jakarta-Beijing relations and the overseas Chinese problem. Regardless, BAKIN remains wary of Beijing-inspired dissidence. For example, BAKIN requires its stamp of approval before Indonesians are permitted to travel to China. Along the same lines, the Indonesian government and military monitor travel to the Middle East with the aid of

²⁹⁷In light of China's occupational claims to several of the disputed Spratly Islands and its past support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the ABRI has just cause for suspecting Chinese interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

²⁹⁸The only evidence found that could correlate to ongoing HUMINT operations abroad.

²⁹⁹Vatikiotis, "Another Step Closer," FEER (November 30, 1989): 36.

³⁰⁰The ABRI are best equipped to fight domestic rather than foreign enemies.

Malaysian intelligence.³⁰¹

Soeharto acts cautiously when dealing with the Middle East.³⁰² Following the Iranian revolution, rising Islamic awareness preoccupied the Soeharto government and ABRI. As a result, Indonesian intelligence also devotes assets to the threat of radicalism provoked by the Middle East. The extent to which Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Libya, actively encourage Muslim extremism in Indonesia is unknown. However, the mechanisms exist for outside funding to Muslim radicals who seek it.³⁰³ The Islamic holy city, Mecca, resides in Saudi Arabia where thousands of Indonesians travel for the hajj: Individuals who return from travel to the Middle East, particularly after academic exchanges, often adapt a more radical view of Islam. As a result Soeharto created a special directorate within the Ministry of Religious Affairs to handle administrative details of the Islamic pilgrimage while the defense ministry and ABRI units monitor the behavior of individuals upon return.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹When questioned about the possibility of Middle Eastern support for Muslim extremists, Sunardi stated that Kommando Jihad extremists were known to have received training in Libya, traveling there via Malaysia. This comment suggests that Indonesian intelligence maintains a working relationship with their Malaysian counterpart. Jakarta, January 19, 1995.

³⁰²See Awanohara, "Staying at Arms Length," FEER (August 9, 1984): 24.

³⁰³Indonesian intelligence assesses that the Kommando Jihad extremist group have received weapons and training from Libya. Sunardi interview.

³⁰⁴These assessments were made from interviews with RADM Sunardi and Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, Minister of Religious Affairs. Jakarta interviews, January 19, 1995.

Additionally, four departments are authorized to control and monitor citizen travel abroad: the Justice and Finance Ministries, Attorney General's Office (regarding sentences and trials), and the BIA.³⁰⁵

3. Middle Eastern Ties

Foreign policy toward the Middle East developed from the efforts of Indonesian exchange students living in Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. They formed committees to lobby for independence, urging the Foreign Ministers Council of the Arab League to recognize the Republic of Indonesia. When the sovereignty issue was taken up at the UN Security Council and General Assembly, the Arab nations strongly supported Indonesia's independence.³⁰⁶ In turn, Indonesia took sides with the Arab nations in the Arab-Israeli dispute, supporting the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs to regain national rights. Ties with the Middle East were further enhanced when Indonesia supported Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in the UN. Conversely, the Middle Eastern countries strengthened their solidarity to Indonesia by favoring the liberation of West Irian.³⁰⁷

Soeharto maintained good relations with Middle Eastern countries, gaining economic investments and political alliances.

³⁰⁵See Suhaini Aznam, "Passport Control," FEER (March 26, 1992): 19-20.

³⁰⁶Kirdi Dipoyudo, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And Africa," vol. 13, no. 4 Indonesian Quarterly (1985): 476.

³⁰⁷Ibid, 477.

In 1975, Iran extended a loan of \$200 million for the construction of a urea fertilizer plant in West Java. Indonesia obtained Saudi money for development projects and the expansion of a fertilizer plant in Palembang. Kuwait and Abu Dhabi also extended aid in the form of small loans. In 1977, Soeharto visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to obtain support on the East Timor issue.³⁰⁸

In matters of substantive political interest, the government exercises pragmatic caution. It implements cautious engagement in Arab-Islamic issues to secure international support over matters vital to Indonesian interests.³⁰⁹ The Iranian revolution drew a silent reaction since a formal statement from the government may have disrupted political stability amidst the Islamic resurgence (movement) in Indonesia. Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East has fostered radical splinters which seek to exclude Western influence while Indonesia remains firmly committed to religious tolerance within and also throughout the ASEAN region.

International Islamic issues closer to home than the Middle East engage concern. Islamic fundamentalism varies widely within the region. An uneven distribution of the Muslim population constitutes a majority in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, but

³⁰⁸Ibid, 484.

³⁰⁹Fora used by Indonesia to strive for its national interests are the Islamic Conference Organization, OPEC, and UNCTAD.

only five percent of the population in Thailand, 10 percent in the Philippines and 17 percent in Singapore.³¹⁰ Regardless, each country has experienced a noticeable resurgence in Islamic activity either as an agent of governmental legitimacy or popular rebellion.³¹¹ Muslim-based insurgencies exist in Thailand and the Philippines. Indonesia does not want to appear supportive of the separatist movements yet it faces domestic pressure to remedy the grievances of fellow Muslims, especially in the case of the Philippines whose proximity is closest. The Philippines presently faces rebellion on the part of Muslims including radical fundamentalists in the south. Separatism among the Muslim population of southern Thailand has reduced significantly as a result of Thai and Malaysian joint military initiatives. In turn, Islam based-insurgencies in Indonesia (Aceh) and the Philippines (Mindanao) have become far more active.³¹²

³¹⁰Tim Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), p. 24.

³¹¹In Brunei, the ruling monarchy projected a new basis of legitimacy in 1992 with its adoption of the concept of "Malay, Muslim, Monarchy." In contrast, rising Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia has been projected in a more radical vision by several groups. Ibid, 24.

³¹²CSIS, A New Regional Order in Southeast Asia (Singapore: CSIS, 1993), p. 19.

C. MUTUAL PROSPERITY

Economic growth, rising standards of living and technological development in Indonesia are powerful influences favoring eventual democratic change. In turn, progress spurred by trade and investment liberalization is important to the stability of the Southeast Asia region as a whole. Increasing U.S. attention placed on Asia-Pacific security affairs is due to economic investments and trade interests. The 17 member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum builds on and contributes significantly to the economic transformation of Southeast Asia. Indonesia figures prominently in APEC dialogues, dictating the need for closer economic cooperation on the America's part.

Beginning in 1966, Soeharto's government initiated pragmatic economic policies, attracting substantial foreign investment. Indonesia was made as open to international influence as other developing countries and has reacted by increasing worldwide interactions, particularly with countries in the Pacific region.³¹³ As a result, the U.S. and Japan took the leadership in a consortium called the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) which coordinated international aid and loans. Trade expanded with Asia, Japan the U.S., Singapore and Western-

³¹³Sukanto Resohadiprodiyo and Sun M. Kahng, "Indonesia and United States Economic Relations," The Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4 (1985): 487.

Europe.³¹⁴ The commodities exported to the U.S. consist of non-oil and gas products such as rubber, palm oil, plywood and textiles. Numerous other international trade and direct investment opportunities in Indonesia were made attractive to U.S. firms, particularly those specializing in industry, commerce and finance.³¹⁵

With an economy expanding by six percent or more a year, the World Bank estimates that Indonesian per capita income is likely to reach \$1000 by the 2000.³¹⁶ Indonesia's economic development over the past 30 years is matched by few developing countries due to its extensive human resources. Today Indonesia is concentrating efforts on developing a vibrant manufacturing sector and larger middle class which offers growing markets for the U.S.³¹⁷ Indonesia's dynamic growth presents excellent opportunities for U.S. businesses primarily in infrastructure projects such as power plants, aerospace and telecommunication development.

³¹⁴Ibid, 486.

³¹⁵By 1984, direct U.S. investment in Indonesia equaled 754.9 million dollars, falling third after investment from Japan and Hong Kong. Ibid, 506-7.

³¹⁶Thomas C. Hubbard, "Indonesia and the United States: Building A New Pacific Community," U.S. Department of State Dispatch (April 25, 1994): 233.

³¹⁷Ibid, 233.

D. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Widespread democratic values influence U.S. stature worldwide both advantageously and sometimes unfavorably. Like-minded nations generally develop mutual foreign policy interests and cooperate, fostering trust and friendship. As a result, the United States actively like-minded allies, advocating a new world order based upon democratic principles. In the post-Cold War era, Indonesia's support for the U.S. remained lukewarm as American concern over democratization and human rights increased, particularly under the Clinton administration. Excluding the anti-Communist purge campaigns, East Timor has been consistently condemned by the United States as the worst blot on Indonesia's human rights record.

East Timor is an Indonesian Christian enclave with an approximate population of 750,000.³¹⁸ When the Portuguese government decolonized its overseas holdings in Southeast Asia, East Timor was unprepared for self-governance and erupted into civil war between three groups. FRETILIN sought the creation of an independent Marxist state; another group advocated integration into Indonesia; and a third group supported a gradual decolonization process.

Portugal's then leftist government abruptly withdrew in August 1975, providing weapons to aid a FRETILIN victory in East Timor. Indonesia invaded in December to prevent the declaration

³¹⁸U.S. State Department Dispatch, "East Timor, Indonesia and U.S. Policy," (March 16, 1992): 213.

of an independent Marxist state. The military's anti-insurgency campaigns killed civilians in the crossfire. FRETILIN insurgents continued operations through the 1980s, provoking increased human rights violations by the Army. As a result, East Timor has been an unending source of human brutality. In 1992, the U.S. Congress terminated IMET funding of approximately \$2.3 million to Indonesia, protesting against the government's failure to initiate stronger measures regarding human rights abuses. Additionally, UN resolutions continually denounce Indonesian aggression despite extensive diplomatic measures regarding human rights. Indonesia is deeply offended by such acts.

Although Timorese armed rebellion has been tamed, the problem remains unresolved because resistance to governmental rule remains strong. Soeharto's government claims that only a tiny percentage of the Timor population rejects national integration. However, the November 1991 Dili event questions his statement.³¹⁹ U.S. interests lie in helping ensure governmental and military accountability are realized regarding both the Dili massacre and further human rights abuses occurring in Indonesia.

U.S. interests do not demand firm judgement regarding the correctness or wrongness of Indonesia's actions in Timor. In fact, Indonesia views any American criticism as interference in its internal affairs. Indonesia also objects to continuous American criticism of the government's attitude toward child

³¹⁹Several thousand unarmed Timorese demonstrators were fired upon by soldiers, killing at least 50 people and wounding more. See Schwarz, Nation In Waiting, 215-8.

labor, minimum wages, and freedom of the press. It is noted that Islam is in no way related to any of these domestic problems. Whatever policy the U.S. decides to pursue with respect to Timor, labor, or freedom of the press, it can not justify or condemn using the basis of religious content.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

"Do not underestimate public opinion in Indonesia. If neglected, it will be cultivated by extremists."³²⁰

The Islamic factor in Indonesian foreign policy has become more significant the last 15 years because of a widespread rise in Islamic fundamentalism. Soeharto has carefully maintained a balance where Islamic issues are concerned, fearing widescale international resurgence.³²¹ He prefers to keep the Arab-Islamic world at a distance because Islam remains a divisive force within. As a result, Indonesian priorities centralize around the regional environment without an identifiable Islamic component. Islam does not contribute to the promotion of ASEAN regional relations particularly since fundamentalism generally seeks to exclude undue involvement of Western powers. Likewise, Indonesia's economic policy is governed by criteria of development rather than Islam.

³²⁰A senior diplomat made this statement which was cited in Leifer, "The Islamic Factor," 157.

³²¹Modernization fueled much of the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. With improved technology and communications capability, rural people see political leaders practice questionable morals and life-styles. Media reports covering Khomeini's ascension to power in Iran inspired the frustrated Indonesian Muslims to renew efforts to gain political power for Islam. Simultaneously, the 1970s Indonesian oil boom led some Muslims to believe that Allah rewarded them with an economic advantage over the West. Fred R. von der Mehden, Religion And Modernization In Southeast Asia (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 257.

A. INDONESIA'S INTERESTS IN THE U.S.

Western countries and capitalism have always been very important in Indonesia's foreign economic relations since the beginning of the New Order to present.³²² Economic contributions from Japan and the U.S. via capital investments and foreign assistance have been substantial.³²³ Japan's growth as a global economic power should enable it to give more aid to Indonesia and lesser developed countries. Indonesia plans on improving relations to make full use of capital, Japanese technological expertise and development experience.³²⁴ Indonesia also regards the U.S. as an important source of technical assistance, capital, technology and skill for its national development programs. It desires continued access to American markets and military procurement privileges under FMS. Financial aid to Indonesia given through the IGGI and IMET have favorably influenced (Indonesian-U.S.) bilateral relations.

Indonesia moved toward closer defense ties with the U.S. in 1990, beginning with joint military exercises. Its interests lie in ensuring some sort of American security umbrella exists. The increased importance of keeping Americans involved in the region,

³²²A.R. Sutopo, "Indonesia Between East And West," vol. 13, no. 4, Indonesian Quarterly (1985): 462.

³²³Japan permits its national oil company to explore and exploit hydrocarbons directly in Southeast Asia and has established numerous private fishery-joint ventures in Indonesia. Mark J. Valencia and St. Munadjat Danusaputro, "Indonesia: Law of the Sea and Foreign Policy Issues," vol. 12, no. 4 Indonesian Quarterly (1984): 489.

³²⁴Roesnadi, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," 72.

following the Philippine base closures and rising Chinese threat, laid the foundation for an informal alignment with America by the end of 1992.³²⁵ A U.S. military role in Southeast Asia has the balancing effect which prevents Japan from becoming directly involved in regional security issues. Japan's dependence on foreign sources for raw materials and markets to sustain its economy makes Indonesia uneasy. Memories of Japanese occupation and the current reality of Tokyo's economic power in the region threaten to gain over the Indonesian economy itself. China's growing power and international assertiveness also haunts the strategic horizon. ABRI leadership is concerned over the possible extension of China's influence southwards through a consolidation of its claims in the South China Sea.³²⁶

Indonesia therefore strongly advocates a continued U.S. presence to counter possible threats arising from the growing strategic reach of East Asian powers.

A regional response to the new world order has been guided by Indonesian proposals to intensify intra-ASEAN security measures.³²⁷ Southeast Asia feels challenged by the emergence

³²⁵Huxley, Insecurity In ASEAN, 24.

³²⁶Indonesia's maritime claims marginally overlap China's.

³²⁷Mindful of sensitivities to the fact that Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia, Soeharto stresses political stability and economic development policy in achieving regional security. Indonesia's willingness to be treated as an equal alongside regional neighbors contributes to ASEAN success. In turn, it expects member countries to extend the same goodwill and demonstrate their commitment to the association. Anwar, "Foreign Policy After The Cold War," 148.

of China, Japan, and possibly India, as military powers. Indonesian intelligence estimates view the Chinese threat, for at least the next decade or two, in terms of support for domestic dissidence.³²⁸ However, Indonesia holds a viable concern that China's economic development might prompt the development of extensive power projection capabilities in the long run.³²⁹ To address this threat, Indonesia seeks more structured military relations among the ASEAN members, short of a pact.³³⁰ It discredits the effectiveness of a regional military pact in light of weakened national identities and defense capabilities. Soeharto advocates overcoming threats by achieving political stability within and building individual national self-reliance and resilience.³³¹ However, he recognizes that the exchange of military information and joint training enhances ASEAN capability to address external threats and resolve security problems.

Previously discussed, the Indonesian Navy's small size and limited capability prevent it from being a maritime power of great consequence. Naval missions encompass patrolling waters to prevent illegal activity while protecting offshore installations; controlling sea lanes and chokepoints; assisting the Singaporean and Malaysian Navies to control the Malacca-Singapore Straits;

³²⁸Harold Crouch, "No Enemy In Sight," FEER (February 14, 1985): 32.

³²⁹A shared concern of all Asian countries, particularly Korea and Japan, and more recently Australia.

³³⁰Anwar, "Foreign Policy After The Cold War," 152.

³³¹Roesnadi, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," 67.

and contributing naval units to an allied ASEAN force in the event of conflict arising with a common enemy.³³² Fast attack and patrol craft could seal the Malacca Strait if the government desired. However, closing the strait is an easier task than keeping it open when a determined foe wants it closed. The vast geographic area to be covered by the Indonesian Navy is near impossible given the lack of well-dispersed bases.³³³

As a result, ABRI values joint Indonesian-U.S. naval exercises tailored to its threat environment. While in the past initiatives between the two countries have been largely symbolic, a great amount of Asian social value or "face" has been attached to relations. The ABRI respects the U.S. military's professionalism and combat superiority. IMET naturally plays a crucial part in military cooperation, serving as an unnecessary irritation point the past few years due to the U.S. decision to cancel funding. The recent influx of high level visits by U.S. military leadership has helped rejuvenate ABRI's faith in American commitment to mutual regional interests and somewhat restored loss of face from IMET cancellation and 1993-94 arms

³³²Straits under Indonesian jurisdiction act as important chokepoints. The most critical is the Malacca-Singapore route used extensively by tankers carry crude oil from the Middle East through the South China Sea to Japan. Interference with shipping in the Strait of Malacca could disrupt the flow of trade not only to the nations in Southeast Asia but to Japan and the U.S. as well. Valencia and Danusaputro, "Law Of The Sea," 484.

³³³The principal naval base is at Surabaya while a western base exists at Tanjung Priok.

sales restrictions.³³⁴

The U.S. position on the Convention of the Law of the Sea is at odds with Indonesia. Some 157 nations have accepted the convention's maritime traffic restrictions, ratifying it while the U.S. rejects it.³³⁵ Despite relatively good relations, differences between Indonesia and the U.S. exist which should be lessened or eliminated. Geography requires all maritime traffic between the Indian and Pacific Oceans to pass somewhere through waters under Indonesian jurisdiction. The shorter of the two major thoroughfares follows the Malacca and Singapore Straits into and through the South China Sea. An alternate route exists through the Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, the Celebes Sea, and south of Mindanao out into the Pacific to Japan. Eastbound traffic proceeds through the Malacca and Singapore Straits from the Arabian Gulf. Ships then continue through the South China Sea to Japan.³³⁶

U.S. interests lie in unimpeded transit of both commercial and military traffic through the Indonesian archipelago, particularly in the absence of a naval base in Southeast Asia. Current economic constraints and defense cuts hinder the availability of U.S. resources to respond militarily to future

³³⁴High level visits included U.S. Commander-In-Chief of the Pacific Admiral (ADM) Macke in last October, Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Owens in March and Commander of Seventh Fleet VADM Clemens in February.

³³⁵Kusumaatmadja, "Indonesia-U.S. Bilateral Relations," 398.

³³⁶Valencia and Danusaputro, "Law Of The Sea," 474.

crises abroad. The U.S. must rely on its carrier battlegroup to show the flag and honor treaty commitments, using mobility as a deterrent. Control of and passage rights through archipelagic choke points are strategic naval interests especially regarding the U.S. fleet submarine force. Indonesia views American rejection of the convention as unreasonable, particularly in light of U.S. increased commitment to Southeast Asian regional security. The Law of Sea specifications complement the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) goals sought within ASEAN. ZOPFAN represents an important regional political and security agenda, strongly opposing the presence of foreign military bases and security alliances with external powers.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Islamic fundamentalism emerges as a phenomenon through three types of movements: revivalism, resurgence, and radicalism.³³⁷ Each group emerges in response to in-country conditions. Islamic fundamentalism is dynamic but not monolithic. A central control or unified organization that supervises all fundamentalist movements does not exist. Ties extended between Muslim countries are usually ideological except for allegations of the exportation

³³⁷Patrick Bannerman, in his study of the Tunisia, classifies these movements into four "trends" of Islamic fundamentalism: (1) Popular preachers with large followings, normally with no axe to grind, and tolerated by their regimes; (2) Small socially active groups seeking to fulfill spiritual needs; (3) Politically active groups using constitutional means to achieve their aims; and (4) Radical extremist groups prepared to achieve goals through violence, some believing violence as a divinely ordained duty. See R.M. Burrell, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism (Great Britain: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1989), chap. 3.

of terrorism abroad through training and funding. Few fundamentalist movements favor violence.³³⁸ Western concern over fundamentalism is irrational and exaggerated.

The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a pervasive universal phenomenon has confronted the U.S. with serious challenges. American response to fundamentalism has not been informed by a clear understanding of the Islamic religious ethos. Ineptitude on this matter runs the risk of harming U.S. strategic and economic interests as experienced with Iran. To ignore religious desires of Indonesian Muslims and concentrate only on the economic drives or secularized political motives limits the U.S. potential for stronger bilateral relations. While not a direct interest of the United States, the existence of religious diversities has a widespread impact on the regional security of Southeast Asia. Specifically, radical Islamic fundamentalism irritates the Buddhists and Christians in the region.

The role of radicalism as a threat to ASEAN stability focuses on the political influences of Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are sensitive to the role that Islam can play in the formulation and implementation of national policies. Indonesia in particular can act as an influential mediator for neighboring governments and radical Muslims. As a leading member of the Organization of Islamic

³³⁸For example, of Egypt's 60 million population, some 200,000 were considered radicals with no more than 10,000 employing violence in 1993. Global Business White Papers, Islamic Fundamentalism, no. 7 (June 1993), p. 15.

Conference (OIC), it enjoys legitimacy as a Muslim nation and is trusted by radicals in the region. Additionally, in the interests of the U.S. and democracy, thus far, Indonesia has kept its political process separate from radical fundamentalist goals.

IMET funding provides an invaluable mechanism which helps foster democratic values and respect for human rights in Indonesia, increasing U.S. influence as a whole.³³⁹ The ABRI establishes what is permitted in Indonesia, dictating which individuals and groups are allowed to participate in official politics. Law and order in Indonesia is primarily the result of the Army's ability to suppress protests and prevent dissidents from speaking out. Repressive measures taken against enemies of the state, referred to as extremists, coincide with efforts to strengthen the pro-government factions within the political parties.³⁴⁰ Enhanced human rights education and military (personnel) exchange programs with the U.S. provide the opportunity to further instill democratic values in ABRI's professional training. As such, IMET promotes better human rights policies by exposing ABRI junior officers to democratic values and initiates military cooperation with Indonesia's future leaders early on. During this time of rising global Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. relations with Indonesia, the world's largest populated Muslim country, remain crucial, regardless of

³³⁹Human rights issues have been an important element of continuing dialogue and good relations with the Indonesian government. State Dispatch, "East Timor", 214.

³⁴⁰Djik, Political Development, 12

its human rights record, and should be sustained not hindered.³⁴¹ As a matter of practical policy, there is no question that the United States should monitor carefully the progression of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesian society. The U.S. should keep in mind, however, that the fear of Islamic radicalism does not influence the formulation of current governmental policies. Mutual security and prosperity are achievable no matter which course President Soeharto pursues in dealing with his Islamic constituents.

³⁴¹Soeharto's government has been challenged by Islam as an international phenomenon to a greater degree than preceding administrations.

APPENDIX A. INDONESIA TRIP REPORT

Assessments. Islam is a sensitive issue to both the government and Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia. There is a general distrust of foreigners and paranoia over outside (U.S.) perceptions of Islam in Indonesia. President Soeharto has been very cautious in exercising control over the emergence of Muslim extremism, the phenomenon labeled Islamic fundamentalism by the U.S. intelligence community. As a result, fundamentalist views are difficult to uncover given the fear of government reprisal.

Internal security is of utmost importance to Soeharto. The government holds a tight rein over public dissent through the use of the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI), namely the Army. It functions to suppress governmental opposition in any form. The military reacts quickly to political speeches made in conjunction with mosques or minor demonstrations. Despite these efforts, Islam easily generates political influence among the masses and can act as a disruptive force.

For that reason, the government, Ministry of Defense (intelligence unit) and Ministry of Religious Affairs closely monitor Muslim travel to Middle Eastern countries, the annual pilgrimage and academic exchanges abroad. Individuals who return from the Middle East generally adopt a more radical view of political Islam. The extent to which Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Libya, actively encourage Muslim extremism in Indonesia is unknown. However, members of the Komando Jihad extremist group are known to have received weapons and training from Libya. The mechanism exists for outside funding to Muslim radicals who seek it.

A large-scale, politically organized movement seeking the establishment of an Islamic state has not existed in Indonesia since the Darul Islam (1965). Following the Iranian revolution, rising Islamic awareness in Indonesia concerned the Soeharto government and the ABRI. Shortly after, the constitution implemented Pancasila as the national ideology, a concept contrary to the fundamentals of Islam which discourage a secular state.

Pancasila was first introduced upon independence in 1945 as the five philosophical principles of nationalism, democracy, humanitarianism, social welfare, and belief in one god. Such principles were created to unify the major cleavages in Indonesian society: Islam and Christianity, aristocracy and peasantry, nationalist and Communist, commercial and agrarian, Javanese and outer island groups. Even today it provides a unifying moral framework for Indonesia's diverse population.

The constitutional necessity for all citizens to believe in one God also legislates Indonesians to profess a faith from one of five officially tolerated religions - Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism. This gives Indonesia the appearance of a religious state to those Muslims who challenge the ideological validity of Pancasila in a largely Islamic country. Soeharto forced the Muslim majority to compromise and

accept the fact that Islam is not the central feature of Indonesia's political system.

Mainstream Muslim political and intellectual thought accept Pancasila as the means of achieving a stable and united country. The special province of Aceh in northern Sumatra is the exception. Acehnese Muslims already advocate a more pure Islam than found in Java, and several actively assist an ongoing insurgency in hopes of achieving a separate state. Unlike northern Sumatra, a large concentration of vocal, puritan Muslims does not exist in Java.

Regardless, small extremist groups and several Muslim radicals remain scattered throughout Indonesia. Currently, those individuals reflect an insignificant or negligible threat to the political stability of Indonesia. This can change without warning. The constraints on political pluralism, an underlying resentment toward wealthy Chinese Christians, underemployment and governmental corruption provide fertile ground for the seeds of extreme Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. The crucial element lies in Indonesia's unknown presidential successor.

The nature of Islamic fundamentalism and evolution of Muslim extremism in Indonesia remains uncertain pending the successful transfer of presidential power and, most importantly, legitimacy. President Soeharto has ensured political stability by exercising military-backed, authoritarian rule. As a result, Muslim extremism has been kept under governmental control. His successor may not be so adept.

Conclusion/Action. The nature and political role of Islam varies in intensity in each Muslim nation. Collectively, the ASEAN region comprises one of the largest concentrations of Muslims in the world. Indonesia's approximately 170 million Muslims represent the world's largest Islamic population in a single country. The successful emergence of Muslim extremism in Indonesia could threaten U.S. and regional security interests.

During my two week stay in Indonesia, I was able to interview government officials, Muslim intellectuals, and a "converted" Muslim extremist who was imprisoned from 1984-93. Prior to and following travel in Indonesia, I worked with JICPAC analysts and conducted research at University of Hawaii's East-West Center (for Asia-Pacific Studies). The information gathered from this trip will be compiled into my thesis and distributed as a final product to JICPAC, DIA and ONI upon completion. (See APPENDIX B. for detailed observations.)

APPENDIX B. DETAILED OBSERVATIONS IN INDONESIA

JAKARTA, Capital City, Java:

17 Jan - Tour of Istigal Mosque, the largest mosque in Southeast Asia and second largest in the world.

18 Jan - Roundtable with U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission Ms. Barbara Harvey and Political Officer (Religious Affairs) Mr. Phillip Antweiler covered the issues of political stability, internal security, the military's political role, and Muslim extremists in Indonesia.

Indonesia experienced much political instability during its early years of independence from the Dutch. Communist insurgencies and Islamic secessionist movements emerged periodically. The two dominant forces which united the country were the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), particularly the Army, and the president. The current Indonesian president, Soeharto, sought the goal of achieving political stability and economic prosperity. After eliminating Communism, he imposed governmental control over Islam's political role through the constitution, imposing a national ideology, and the military. It is the view of the DCM and Political Officer that there are few individuals who favor the establishment of an Islamic state. They are also of the opinion that the support or momentum for a massive, organized Islamic movement does not exist in Indonesia. Unlike the case of Iran, a charismatic Muslim leader who favors a drastic change in the form of government has yet to emerge.

The occasional unrest that periodically appears in Indonesia has been correlated with "simple social rioting" not a threat instilled by radical fundamentalists. While groups or individuals may opt for using the Islamic banner for mass appeal in leading these riots and voicing dissent, by and large the government maintains tight control over the emergence of Muslim extremism.

The military's gradual shift toward aligning with Western views indicates the beginnings of a diminishing political role in society. More than likely, this trend will not leave an opening in the political vacuum for Islam to fill. Although the recently (1991) established ICMI (Muslim Intellectual think-tank) borders on having a political agenda, the DCM is of the opinion that its primary function remains in the development of human resources.

Indonesians are particularly sensitive toward the topic of fundamentalism. It was strongly suggested to avoid usage of the word by substituting with the terms "political Islam" or "the extreme right."

- Interview with Dr. H. Munawir Sjadzali, Member Supreme Advisory Council and former Minister of Religious Affairs.

Munawir relayed the opinion that those who garner strong feelings toward the making of an Islamic republic should give up that goal. While the majority population claims to be Muslim, several eastern areas of Indonesia foster other religions, for example Bali is Hindu and East Timor is Catholic. Under the establishment of an Islamic state, the other minority (religious)

areas would notably be alienated and suffer.

As long as there is a predominately Muslim majority in Indonesia, Pancasila will remain the state ideology not Islam. However, unlike the West, particularly the United States, Indonesia is not a secular state. Secularism rejects the involvement of the state in religious life. Contrary to this concept, the Indonesian government allows religion to be taught in schools starting at the elementary school level. Munawir was quick to stress that although religion is taught in all schools, it is taught according to the chosen religion of the student (not just Islam).

The mainstream Muslims accept that Islam should not have a political role. There is a negligible percentage of individuals who advocate an Islamic state. However, Munawir briefly discussed the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident which involved Muslim rioting inspired by dissent expressed in a local mosque. He stated that those individuals involved could not accept Pancasila as the state ideology resulting in their imprisonment. As acting Minister of Religious Affairs, he later received letters of "repentance" vowing agreement to the government's view of Islam's proper role. One of the formerly imprisoned Muslim extremists, Fatwa, is now a close friend of Munawir.

Munawir claims that no extremists operate today. At the same time he acknowledged that the Darul Islam rebellion (Islamic movement following independence) existed and those few remaining individuals (who support Darul Islam or extremist ideology) are "nothing to be worried about." Later in a passing comment, Munawir joked that "Aceh (special province in Northern Sumatra) is the exception" to the mainstream Muslim thought that prohibits the establishment of an Islamic state.

Author of the 1992 article, "Muslims' Interests Are Better Served In The Absence of Muslim Parties," Munawir's personal position is that the threat of an Islamic state no longer exists. He cites that since 1985, all socio-political institutions including Muslim parties and social organizations agreed to accept "Pancasila" as the sole and only basis for the nation. He feels that with this acceptance, Indonesian Muslims have formally given up the idea of an Islamic state, eliminating the possibility altogether. He further states that democracy and close adherence to Pancasila will enable Muslim political interests and religious life to be better served.

19 Jan - Interview with RADM R. M. Sunardi, Chief of Staff for Social-Political Affairs, Ministry of Defense and Security.

The ABRI follows a doctrine of "National Resilience" which pledges loyalty to the people of Indonesia. Its principles are to aid in the development and management of socio-political problems. Sunardi perceives the military (and Defense Ministry) as a "mediator" of the "frictions" that exist between the government and the people.

Concerning internal security threats, Sunardi does not view Muslim extremism as a potential problem. Pancasila has instilled the principle of harmony among religions in Indonesia. However,

operationally speaking, this goal of national unity faces several impediments namely geographical separations between the islands and ethnic diversities. He emphasized the real threat to internal security as being Communism, the extreme left. To detect extremism, both military and state intelligence organizations exist such as the BIA and BAKIN.

The primary focus of these intelligence units and the Defense Ministry remains internal as opposed to external; however, Sunardi stated that solid evidence was gathered proving the 1965 Communist coup attempt received funding from China. (A likely indication that intelligence assets are devoted to maintaining a watchful eye on China and its ties to the overseas Chinese living in Indonesia.) He acknowledged avid anti-Chinese sentiment exists among many Indonesians due to their dominance (apparent economic wealth) over the business sector. He also implied that the Ministry equates anti-Chinese sentiment with anti-Christian sentiment.

Sunardi stated that the academic exchanges which occur with Middle Eastern countries do not present a threat of radicalizing returning students. He wanted to portray the image that the Indonesians studying abroad return shocked with all the violence in the Middle East and advocate a moderate (not radical) implementation of Islam in government.

Of note, when questioned about possible Middle Eastern funding for extremists, particularly the group known as "Komando Jihad", Sunardi acknowledged the existence of approximately 100 Libyan-trained insurgents (Muslim extremists) that remain spread throughout Indonesia. He stated that these individuals traveled to Libya via Malaysia. (Another indication of external intelligence, this time with the function of monitoring travel to and from Middle Eastern countries.)

- Interview with Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, Minister of Religious Affairs, retired RADM.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs is unique to Indonesia. Its two main functions are: to encourage duty to religion and inter-religion harmony. The ministry was started solely for Islamic affairs shortly after independence to protect the governmental interests of religious harmony and an integrated nation. It provided a venue for the government to influence popular Muslim religious leaders and, in turn, the people.

Religious instruction in schools is mandatory in both government sponsored and private institutions, from kindergarten through college. This religious education applies to all faiths. Islam is taught in pesantrens or madrasas, similar to Catholicism in seminaries. The minimum instruction lasts two hours a week, similar to the Christian concept of Sunday-school.

Islamic studies abroad were primarily conducted in the Middle East and with the Arabs. Taher claimed that today Arabs now have "marginal influence." The ministry's present efforts encourage scholars to pursue studies in Pakistan, the U.S. and Europe. Its intentions are to allow a mixture of ideas to align the ummah (Indonesian Muslim community) with "moderate" Islamic

views. Academic exchanges still occur with universities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia. Ministry fellowships or grants are given to students, sometimes fully paid for by the host country.

Taher described the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident as tension and conflict which arose from a local mosque resulting in a security clash with the military. Several Muslims feared the subordination of Islam to Pancasila. He added that the uneducated population in the rural areas make up extremist groups such as the Darul Islam and Komando Jihad. Those groups lack a political basis or organization and number fewer than 100 individuals.

A specific directorate within the Ministry of Religion exists to manage the Islamic pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. It requires four to six months of preliminary work covering immigration, passport, bank, accommodation and airline travel issues. Every one in a thousand Indonesian travels the pilgrimage. Indonesia sends the most pilgrims out of all Muslim countries. This May, a quota of 194,000 will be filled at a cost of \$1000 per person.

20 Jan - Meeting with Ms. Clara Yoewono, Assistant Director for Public Affairs and Mr. Harry Tjan Silalahi, Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Despite grievances with President Soeharto, his implementation of Pancasila as the national ideology is "heartening" to the minority religious groups. It forces the majority Muslim population to accept and tolerate other religious practices in Indonesia. Pancasila ensures the safety of minorities. Opposition to Pancasila seems virtually nonexistent, or is simply not voiced for fear of the government's reprisal/actions. An undertone still exists among the Muslims which favors the establishment of an Islamic state. Because no official statements can be made advocating negara Islam, remaining supporters use different strategies. Methods to aspire for the formation of an Islamic state are likely available through the channels of education, legislation and the mosques.

Soeharto's support for the establishment of ICMI upset the Christians and other minority (religious) groups. It has tilted the balance of political power among groups in favor of the Muslims. Within ICMI, there are individuals who have a political agenda who can now exercise some leverage or influence over Soeharto.

Regarding internal security threats, previous economic-motivated anger toward the Chinese has shifted to religious-motivated anger, reflecting an anti-Christian tone. Yoewono also pointed out that "radical splinters" of Muslims exist. For example, the Komando Jihad represents a splinter group of the Darul Islam. Silalahi indicated that fanatic sentiments are also alive among several Muslim intellectuals. Additionally, he believes that in order for Indonesia to become a successful nation amidst globalization, its predominately Muslim population

must learn to accept two things: the improved status of women and political leadership of a non-Muslim.

- Dr. Mochtar Pabottingi, Director of Center for Political and Religious Studies, LIPI Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

The history of Indonesia reflects the failure of Islam to exercise a constructive political role in Indonesia. As a result the mainstream Muslim intellectual thought agrees that the separation of Islam from politics and government is the most effective means of achieving a stable political environment, and religious harmony. Those individuals who advocate the establishment of an Islamic state abandon this goal as they become more educated and less ignorant. The percentage of Muslim extremists is negligible, if any exist. Pabottingi is against Islam having a larger political role.

MEDAN, Northern Sumatra:

21 Jan - Prof. Asma Affan, Senior Lecturer of Political Science, University of North Sumatra.

Affan feels that Pancasila is not necessarily compatible with the teachings of Islam. In theory, Pancasila is an ingenuous concept that encourages national unity and good morals. In reality, it seems to foster materialism and individualism as a necessity of the globalization process of Indonesia. Since 1965, Indonesia has experience rapid development. Despite this, Sumatra has not experienced many benefits. There are less businesses (in Sumatra), foreign investment remains hesitant, and skilled labor must be brought in from Java. Along those lines, politics center around Java regardless of the fact that valuable economic resources exist in the outer islands. Yet another criticism, the political system as it is does not allow members from outside its appointed circle to lead much less influence political change.

Corruption within the government down to the village level remains a problem. Although the people are encouraged to communicate their problems to officials, corruption sometimes prevents common complaints from being aired. Communication between the lowest (village) to highest level also becomes hindered by geography. Affan stated that Islam can aid the government in solving future problems by instilling proper morals, encouraging widespread education and managing socio-economic welfare programs among the people.

22 Jan - Roundtable with Dras. Sri Minda Murni, M.S., Lecturer at Medan University and Idjah, M.A., Lecturer at University of North Sumatra.

Islam in Indonesia is different from the Middle East in the sense that it seeks harmony with the other religions practiced in the country. Past cultural practices have allowed the absorption of Hindu and Buddhist influences in many Indonesian customs; however, Muslims recognize these practices as customs not religious obligations. The word "orthodox" denotes a negative connotation when used in regard to Indonesian Islam. A better description would be the phrase "pure Islam" which describes a

different level of devoutness found in every individual.

The Islam found in Sumatra and Java appears different due to external influences the Javanese mixed in their teachings of Islam. Sumatra has the more "pure" Islam. The use of veiled dress by women is more prevalent in Sumatra. However, this is only one aspect of the comprehensive teachings of the Qur'an which the West chooses to associate with Islamic repression of women. Nuns in America choose to veil themselves according to the teachings and their belief of Biblical scriptures. Likewise, those Muslim women who have reached a certain level of devoutness and personal enlightenment believe in veiling themselves in Indonesia. The women who choose not to veil themselves are not looked down upon. Personal relationships with God vary according to the individual.

- Tour of Mesjid Raya, the "Great Mosque" which is centrally located in the city represents the largest mosque in Sumatra. Before entrance into the mosque I was required to dress appropriately in veil. Several ritualistic motions were conducted during prayers which I observed both at a Muslim residence and the Mesjid Raya. Prior to conducting prayers all Muslims thoroughly cleansed themselves in a separate room/area.

BANDUNG, Capital of West Java:

23 Jan - Tour of the Asia-Africa Museum. Bandung is the third largest city in Indonesia with a population of 1.7 million. Its claim to fame came in 1955 when it provided the site for the Afro-Asian conference, commemorated by the Asia-Africa Museum. Leaders of third world countries met at Bandung, forming the early beginnings of the Non-aligned Movement. Today, Bandung is a big university town which is starting to attract high-tech business with its affluent intellectual environment and prestigious Institut Teknologi Bandung.

24 Jan - Interview with Dr. Juhaya S. Praja, Lecturer, Islamic Studies Institute (EIEN), and Roundtable with two EIEN professors and Dr. H. Ahmad Supardi, President of EIEN in Bandung.

Juhaya feels that a new trend in Indonesia reflects the view that a Muslim political party no longer carries importance. The majority of the Muslim population accepts Pancasila as an ideology and adhere to Sunnism. Only a small group of Shii (less than 1000) exist in Indonesia and they remain quiet. Sumatra may appear to have a more pure form of Islam because animism and Buddhist/Hindu mixtures are not so readily accepted by Muslims as in Java. Efforts to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia dissolved around 1962. Today Indonesia Muslims are content to "agree to disagree" regarding religious beliefs.

As a whole, they all expressed that ICMI does not threaten to imbalance political influence among the religious groups in Indonesia because each religion has its own intellectual think-tank. ICMI represents a society of professionals who unite to further develop Indonesian science and technology. However, there is no question that ICMI has substantial political

influence under the supervision of Minister of Research and Technology Dr. Habibie.

As expected with 87 percent of the population adhering to Islam, a minimum of 50 Islamic national organizations exist in Indonesia. The N.U. represents the greatest social, Islamic progressive organization. Its leaders defend the old teachings of the Qur'an and seek preserving Islamic traditions. The Muhammadiyah also bases its formation on the Qur'an and traditions but originated as a result of Mohammad Abduh's reformist teachings in Egypt. An organization known as PERSIS also exists. Its theology originates from the Wahhabis (early fundamentalist group) in Saudi Arabia.

Supardi pointed out that Islamic law exists in Indonesia; however, what is written in theory differs from what is practiced. Four court systems exist: homes affairs (civil), military, Islamic, and general (criminal). The general courts handle grievances of the other religions.

There are 14 state Islamic Studies (university) Institutes throughout Indonesia. The one in Bandung accommodates approximately 7000 students. Seven faculties exist: two in Islamic law, two in Islamic education, theology, propagation/preaching, and the faculty of letters. Islamic studies is a life-long educational process that begins at the pesantren level carried through elementary, secondary, and high schools to the university and higher learning levels. Before acceptance to an EIEN, two entrance tests are administered. The written tests examines the students' ability to read, comprehend and recite the writings of the Qur'an and other Islamic devotions. Four other areas are tested: general sciences, the English, Indonesian and Arabic languages. The oral test further examines familiarity with Islamic teachings and the Qur'an. Three outstanding high school students are selected yearly to attend the EIEN and are subjected to an oral review before entrance.

- Visit to SURYALAYA Pondok pesantren. The pesantren plays a key role in providing Islamic education for many Javanese communities. It draws followers from various social strata, occupations and regions with the goal of improving spiritual needs of the less fortunate. This particular pesantren was founded by Shaykh Abdullah Mubarak in 1905. Kiyahi Abah Anom, an immediate relative of Mubarak, has acted as the head since 1956. The title of kiyahi signifies the cultural and Islamic leader of the pesantren who provides religious guidance (blessings), supervision and personal counseling to members of the community. While at this pesantren, I observed the local Muslims' reverant behavior toward the kiyahi and his granting of blessings. Additionally, a delegation from Bandung met with Kiyahi Anom to present the construction plans for a new mosque (approved and funded by Soeharto's governmental programs and Pancasila).

- Tour of the Bandung Army Museum, Darul Islam exhibit.

The Museum was established by Indonesia's elite Army division, Siliwangi, which is headquartered in Bandung. The Museum commemorates the Siliwangi troops participation and

suppression of insurgencies and rebellions which have occurred throughout Indonesia's history. The Siliwangi colors are proudly displayed along with an extensive exhibit of the Army's struggle against the Darul Islam (Islamic rebellion) in West Java.

Central Java:

JOGJAKARTA was the center of resistance to the Dutch and acted as the capital city of the revolution against Holland following WWII. Today, Jogja is the cultural and artistic center of Java. Two great Buddhist and Hindu dynasties were located in Central Java until the rise of Islam carried sultans to power.

26 Jan - Interview with Dr. Baroroh Baried, Distinguished Professor, American Studies Graduate Program at Gadjah Mada University, Jogjakarta covering fundamentalism and women.

The reformist ideas of Mohammad Abduh (Egypt) entered in the early 19th century. Simultaneously Indonesia began changing its perception of women. Women can fulfill any or all of these three roles: as a homemaker, community social worker, and as a professional with a career. AISYIYAH is an Islamic organization that promotes the status of women in Indonesia. In accordance with the government and its attempt to improve the status of women, AISYIYAH encourages Pancasila as the way of life. It is separated into five levels: national, provincial, municipal, district and sub-district. Its emphasis centers around social, educational and religious activities and operates under the umbrella of the Muhammadiyah organization.

The evolution of new, modernist ideas has forced men to share in the duties of maintaining a proper home and caring for the family. Islam encourages the traditional roles in which the woman acts a mother and wife while the husband acts as the protector and leader. Only recently has a broader interpretation and application of these roles extended to advance the status of women in Indonesian society.

Islam can play a key role in solving Indonesia's socio-economic problems if it continues in the current direction. Islam must aid in managing two crucial things: the mastering of fields of knowledge in all subjects through the highest formal education possible, and encouraging Muslims to uphold morals by being good people.

- Tour of Borobudur Temple, site of the 1985 terrorist bombing. Borobudur was one of the greatest Southeast Asian Buddhist monuments, abandoned shortly after its completion in 850 AD. Nearly 1500 panels on its terraces illustrate Buddhist teachings and relay a tale depicted by over 400 Buddha images. The first restoration project was completed in 1983 at a cost of over US\$25 million. A second restoration project (worth US\$12 million) was undertaken by the Soeharto government following the 1985 Komando Jihad (Muslim extremist) bombing of the historic site.

- Candi Pawon and Mendut Temple. Both built during the same time period of Borobudur. Worshippers purified themselves at Candi Pawon on their way to Borobudur. Mendut has extensive

galleries, terraces and a stupa on top of a pyramid-shaped roof. It is known for its magnificent statue of Buddha seated with two disciples.

- Kota Gede Islamic Center, grave of Prince Senopati.

Founded in 1579, Kota Gede was once the capital of the old Mataram kingdom. The grave of Senopati, founder of Mataram, is situated next to an ancient mosque. Other royal personages are entombed nearby the Islamic center.

- Jogja Kraton, the palace compound of Javanese sultans.

During the war for Indonesia's independence, guerilla commander Soeharto (current president) dressed as a kraton peasant to confer with the sultan on guerilla tactics to use against the Dutch. The walled fortified palaces of Javanese rulers were historic centers of political power and culture. The two most famous kratons reside in Jogja and Solo.

SOLO, also called Surakarta, is the traditional, original capital of the Javanese kingdom. It is the only city that widely uses the Javanese written language today.

27 Jan - Prambanan Hindu temple. The biggest Hindu temple complex in Java containing the ruins of 224 temples. The central courtyard contains three large structures: a main temple dedicated to Shiva, flanked by those of Brahma and Vishnu. The largest of these, Shiva temple, has been restored and portrays 42 scenes from the Hindu epic Ramayana.

SURABAYA, Capital of East Java:

The second largest city and major port in Indonesia. It was leveled on 10 Nov 1945 when the Dutch tried to reclaim the city after Japanese surrender. Surabaya's resistance symbolizes the country's determination to rid itself of colonial rule and the day is celebrated as National (Revolutionary) Heroes' Day.

28 Jan - Gresik, tomb of the Muslim saint. Saint Sunan Giri is credited with introducing the religion of Islam to Java in the 13th Century.

- Interview with Prof. Dr. H. Mohammad Koesnoe, Director of Middle Eastern Studies Center, EIEN, Surabaya.

Several varieties of Islam exist in Indonesia according to the different spiritual atmosphere of areas. Koesnoe stated that Sumatra may seem more "pure" but they are also more "vocal" in the nature of their Islam. Java is more emotional and inward looking. Different interpretations exist whereas Sumatra, particularly Aceh, practice an Islam that is more Arabic or Middle Eastern in nature. When Islam arrived in Java, people were naive and blended their previous religious beliefs with those of Islam, essentially just changing names and terminology. Sumatra has had longer ties to the Middle East since Islam came straight to the island from Persia.

In the later stage of Islamic development in Java, Muslim awareness increased as more scholars traveled abroad and made contact with orthodox (pure) Islam. Koesnoe believes that the difference between orthodoxy and unorthodox practice lies in

certain disciplines. Both schools of thought accept the fundamentals of Islam as being the Qur'an and the Sunnah (example set by Prophet Mohammad's life). The difference lies in the objectivity of interpretations. Orthodoxy requires an individual to follow the majority opinion of the Muslim community. On the other hand, an individual may achieve his/her own interpretation through analysis and use of reasoning.

Pancasila was an amusing topic of discussion to Koesnoe. Although Pancasila exists as the nation's ideological and philosophical framework, it has yet to be stated in detail as a law. Pancasila is rather a tool of integration. Citizens of the U.S. live in peace and plurality under a "nation of law" and the constitution. Indonesia seems to be a "nation of culture."

Muslim extremists choose to interpret the Qur'an differently as the government, in good faith, holds its own interpretation with the establishment of Pancasila. Individuals may be at odds with the government view but do not voice their opinions. Koesnoe admits that it is common for those Islamic students studying abroad in the Middle East to return with more radical views of the proper role of Islam, but the government monitors their activities closely.

In closing, Koesnoe was of the opinion that Indonesia is a nation that is moving away from Islamic or Qur'anic teachings toward Western values.

JAKARTA:

29 Jan - Interview with A.M. Fatwa, "converted" Muslim extremist, former political prisoner from 1984-1993.

Fatwa was arrested following the Tanjung Priok incident in 1984. Muslim rioting occurred after a local mosque leader preached criticisms of the government. The military killed and detained people involved in the demonstrations. Fatwa gave a political speech implying that Pancasila was being used as a tool of persecution against politically active Muslims. Prior to Tanjung Priok, a petition was signed by 50 prominent citizens some of which were former military officers and intellectual leaders. Fatwa was one of the signatories to the petition, and as a result of his actions and views the Soeharto government arrested him.

While jailed, Fatwa met Muslim extremists in various prisons, specifically the two located at Bogor and Cirebon. He stated that supporters of the Darul Islam exist today. While Fatwa was in prison, he was only allowed to receive mail and visits from his wife. He sought creative means to maintain his contacts. In addition to extensive beatings, the government moved him from prison to prison throughout Java to make such endeavors virtually impossible.

Upon his release from prison in 1993, a forum was organized for Fatwa to give a speech. His current outlook praises the "cooperative, lenient" attitude the government and military is exercising toward Muslims. He feels that both the Indonesian intelligence organization and ABRI have learned from their mistake in the mishandling of the Tanjung Priok incident.

Of note, the interview with Fatwa was an interesting experience in itself. Since his English was poor, an interpreter (female) accompanied Fatwa. Her behavior was peculiar; she was extremely nervous and on edge. Not only did she refrain from offering a full translation of Fatwa's responses, but several times engaged in heated debate with him (in Indonesian) before paraphrasing his answer. Additionally, she chose to answer some of my questions herself instead of interviewing Fatwa.

30 Jan - Meeting with Col. McFetridge, DATT, USDAO Jakarta.

The government maintains tight control over the internal security threats such as the emergence of Muslim extremism. Regardless, there are individuals who remain in country and resort to violent means. Fundamentalism does exist in Indonesia despite the apparent mixing of Buddhist-Hindu religious cultures with Islam in Java. Sumatra's insurgency in Banda Aceh has an Islamic flavor; however, the people living there do not have a more outwardly Islamic appearance when compared to the rest of Indonesia.

The Darul Islam rebellion officially ended around 1965 but elements of the same ideological view exist today. It can be expected that most supporters either permanently reside in prison or keep their views secret.

Col. McFetridge also relayed to me that Soeharto has overplayed the importance of Pancasila. Once a month, every month, government and military officials rally together for the Pancasila indoctrination. Everyone gathers to chant the words in Indonesian, Arabic and sit through lengths of ceremony devoted to the makings and philosophy of the national ideology. In a sense it has become a joke, and is ridiculed by some.

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